Search Climate Insights Directory

The briefing argues that the steel sector, which accounts for 5% of global CO2 emissions, requires a dedicated international framework to prevent emissions growth driven by demand. It recommends a 'bottom-up' approach using existing national policies—such as China's energy efficiency targets and India's 'Perform, Achieve and Trade'—as building blocks. To overcome competitiveness fears and carbon leakage, the author proposes establishing a steel-specific negotiation forum within the UNFCCC. This forum would address six abatement categories, ranging from closing inefficient plants to developing breakthrough technologies, and would integrate technical industry expertise to ensure ambitious national commitments.

The report argues that carbon capture and storage (CCS) is essential to meeting mid-century climate goals because coal remains a dominant global energy source. It proposes a three-phase industry development model: a 'pioneer phase' to eliminate technical risks, a 'cost reduction phase' to scale deployment to 50 GW, and a 'mature industry phase' for deep emissions reductions. Key recommendations include a $20 billion investment for a diverse portfolio of pioneer projects by 2018, the implementation of GHG emissions performance standards for new and existing coal and gas plants, and the creation of Geologic Sequestration Utilities (GSUs) to manage CO2 storage. The report also emphasizes international collaboration with China and the use of reverse auctions to distribute financial incentives efficiently.

The document argues that national-level analyses of carbon leakage underestimate the severe economic risks to Old Industrial Regions (OIRs), where heavy industry is highly concentrated. Using an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model for the Basque Country, the authors find that relocating 1.5% to 35% of iron and steel production could lead to a GDP drop of up to 2.26%. While such relocation reduces CO2 emissions, the implicit cost of this mitigation (187 to 202 €/Tco2) is significantly higher than technological alternatives like carbon capture and storage. The authors recommend that climate policies be carefully designed to avoid imposing undue burdens on sectors prone to relocation in OIRs.

The study investigates the optimal abandonment of coal-fired power plants in the EU, considering uncertainties in coal, gas, and CO2 emission allowance prices. Using a three-dimensional binomial lattice, the authors find that abandonment is unlikely unless CO2 prices reach very high levels, particularly because plants can operate as peaking units. The decision is heavily influenced by the plant's remaining lifetime, thermal efficiency, and the volatility of carbon prices.

The document proposes a reverse auction system for CCS deployment, where the government procures CO2 sequestration by awarding incentives to the lowest bidders. It suggests separate auctions for projects with and without enhanced oil recovery (EOR) access and a grant loan program to mitigate early development risks. The author argues that this market-based approach is more efficient than fixed-level incentives, potentially doubling the capacity deployed compared to mechanisms proposed in the Kerry-Boxer bill.

The paper examines the complexity of comparing national emissions pledges due to inconsistent base years, varying scopes of greenhouse gases, and divergent accounting methods for LULUCF. It analyzes the specific pledges of Annex I countries (Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Russia, Kazakhstan) and non-Annex I countries (China, India), highlighting how 'cherry picking' accounting systems can make targets appear more ambitious than they are. The authors recommend a common accounting framework where countries provide scenarios showing how energy-related emissions, LULUCF, and international offsets contribute to their total commitments.

The report examines the environmental, social, and economic impacts of unconventional oil extraction, focusing on tar sands and oil shale. It highlights that these resources produce significantly higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional oil and cause severe local ecological damage, such as boreal forest destruction in Canada. The document criticizes the EU's Fuel Quality Directive for potentially underestimating the carbon intensity of these fuels and urges the EU to discourage their import and investment. It also details the involvement of European companies in projects across Venezuela, Madagascar, Congo, Russia, Jordan, and Morocco, warning that such developments in countries with weak governance risk exacerbating the 'resource curse' and undermining Millennium Development Goals.

The report outlines the results of expert dialogues held between 2009 and 2010 focused on North American energy and climate collaboration. It highlights a period of significant political uncertainty, particularly regarding U.S. federal legislation, and argues that Canada and Mexico must engage actively in policy discussions to avoid becoming "policy takers." Key areas for cooperation include carbon pricing, renewable energy investment, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and transportation fuel standards. The document emphasizes that while a unified "North American Bubble" for emissions targets is unlikely, pragmatic, sector-specific coordination and the harmonization of technical standards offer viable paths forward in the absence of a continental regulatory framework.

Scientists advocate for the U.S. to provide $1 billion for REDD+ to protect tropical forests, citing their role in carbon storage and biodiversity.

The report analyzes the impasse in WTO Doha Round negotiations regarding environmental goods and services (EGS), specifically the difficulty in defining and listing goods for tariff reduction. It proposes a framework for progress by examining the structures of the CITES, Rotterdam, and Stockholm Conventions, as well as the Energy Star, Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), and coffee sustainability labels. The authors recommend that the WTO avoid creating its own standards, instead referencing external scientific standards, establishing a technical advisory body, and incorporating flexibility through reservations and special treatment for developing countries.

The response argues that while a UK carbon price floor aims to increase the viability of low-carbon investments, a unilateral approach may be discounted by investors due to regulatory instability and inconsistency with the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). It suggests that strengthening the EU ETS targets would provide greater clarity, regulatory stability, and market scale for low-carbon technologies like CCS and nuclear power, compared to a national tax-based supplement.

The report identifies 'Carbon Fat Cats'—companies that received excessive free emissions permits under Phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008-2012). It finds that the top ten companies held 35 million surplus permits in 2008, valued at €500 million, with projected surpluses reaching 230 million permits (€3.2 billion) by 2012. This over-allocation in industrial sectors like iron, steel, and cement means that a small number of power companies, specifically RWE and EON, must deliver the majority of the scheme's net emissions reductions. The report argues that this creates competitive distortions and undermines climate targets, recommending higher ambition (a 30% cut by 2020), limited access to overseas offsets, and the cancellation of Member State reserves.

The document analyzes a body of literature from Canadian think tanks, identifying a tension between a 'climate view' (top-down carbon pricing) and an 'energy view' (market-driven supply). It argues for a forward-looking national energy strategy that reconciles Canadian supply expansion with global clean energy demand, emphasizing the need for intergovernmental cooperation between federal, provincial, and territorial governments to overcome regulatory fragmentation and protect trade interests, particularly with the United States.

The document examines Canada's position as a major energy producer and the risks associated with its fragmented, province-led energy approach. It highlights the tension between Canada's traditional energy exports—particularly oil sands—and the global shift toward clean energy. The authors argue that a national strategy is essential to meet climate goals, protect trade interests (especially with the U.S.), and establish global leadership in technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS). It also assesses the current 'patchwork' of international energy governance, including the roles of the IEA, IRENA, and trade agreements like NAFTA.

The report analyzes a global energy regime in transition, driven by energy security, economic efficiency, and climate change. It highlights a 'business as usual' scenario where primary energy demand increases by 40% by 2030, dominated by fossil fuels, versus a low-carbon growth scenario requiring US$10.5 trillion in additional investments. The document emphasizes the critical roles of the U.S. and China in shaping this transition, noting that while China leads in public green investment, the U.S. focuses on 'clean energy jobs' and reducing oil dependence. It argues that a clear carbon price signal is essential to drive the private investment needed for a systemic shift toward carbon-free technologies.

The document examines six CCS case studies, finding that successful projects typically employ two-way consultation and transparency, while failures often stem from one-way information delivery, perceived lack of community influence, or the unilateral removal of promised local benefits.

The World Resources Institute analysis finds that while existing federal and state tools can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, even the most ambitious 'Go-Getter' scenario falls short of the U.S. Copenhagen pledge to reduce emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. The report models three levels of regulatory ambition—Lackluster, Middle-of-the-Road, and Go-Getter—across key sectors including power plants, transportation, and industry. It concludes that additional legislative action is necessary to meet international climate targets and the long-term goal of 80 to 95 percent reductions by 2050.

The report examines the intersection of water scarcity and power generation in South and Southeast Asia, arguing that while regulatory protections have historically shielded shareholders, increasing water stress driven by climate change and demographic pressure creates material financial risks. It introduces a risk exposure framework based on business models, water dependency, and water security, and highlights that a significant portion of existing and planned capacity in the region is located in water-stressed areas.

The author, a Shell executive, asserts that achieving a sustainable energy future requires integrating sustainable development into business decisions and establishing a collaborative relationship between governments and industry. Shell utilizes 'scenarios' to navigate energy uncertainty and advocates for the 'Blueprints' model, which emphasizes anticipation of environmental issues. The paper highlights carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a critical technology for large emitters, noting that public policy and financial support, such as carbon pricing, are essential for its commercial viability. Using examples from Wyoming and Brazil, the author demonstrates how industry can manage environmental risks and community concerns. Finally, the document emphasizes that governments must appreciate the immense costs, long lead times, and technical challenges of energy production—exemplified by the Perdido project—to set workable regulations.

The report examines the steel sector's role in global emissions, specifically focusing on China and India. It identifies six abatement categories, noting that while new plants often meet best available technology (BAT) standards, significant potential remains in closing obsolete plants, improving efficiency in existing facilities, and increasing scrap recycling. The study suggests that a national approach combining carbon pricing with non-price incentives (like investment capital) is more viable than transnational trading. Initial modelling indicates that with a carbon price of $25/tCO2, China could abate up to 150 MtCO2/year and India up to 40 MtCO2/year, potentially generating significant financial flows through credits.