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The research examines the potential for a 'resource curse' in four African nations soon to become oil-dependent. Using a game-theoretic model and the concept of 'limited access orders,' the author argues that oil rents typically disrupt political incentives, undermining economic performance and potentially destabilizing the state. While Ghana is identified as a potential exception due to its robust democracy and lower projected oil-to-tax revenue ratio, the other cases show higher risks of repression or predatory behavior. The paper concludes that radical policy interventions like 'cash-to-citizen' transfers are implausible because they ignore the domestic political equilibria and patronage networks that maintain stability.

The paper examines the role of ivory speculators in China, distinguishing between large criminal syndicates (Type I) and private retail investors (Type II). It argues that an indefinite ban, implemented swiftly and combined with demand-reduction campaigns, is the most effective way to trigger a 'fire sale' of stockpiles, thereby crashing prices and reducing the incentive for poaching. Conversely, a finite ban could incentivize 'banking on extinction,' where speculators drive species scarcity to maximize future monopoly rents. The authors recommend that China destroy its official stockpiles and regulate the mammoth ivory trade to prevent it from being used as a cover for laundering illegal elephant ivory.