WORKING PAPER SPECULATING AN IVORY FIRE SALE: OPTIONS FOR CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC IVORY TRADE BAN

The paper examines the role of ivory speculators in China, distinguishing between large criminal syndicates (Type I) and private retail investors (Type II). It argues that an indefinite ban, implemented swiftly and combined with demand-reduction campaigns, is the most effective way to trigger a 'fire sale' of stockpiles, thereby crashing prices and reducing the incentive for poaching. Conversely, a finite ban could incentivize 'banking on extinction,' where speculators drive species scarcity to maximize future monopoly rents. The authors recommend that China destroy its official stockpiles and regulate the mammoth ivory trade to prevent it from being used as a cover for laundering illegal elephant ivory.

• The authors argue that the most effective policy for the Chinese government is to implement an indefinite domestic ivory trade ban as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2016, to avoid creating incentives for speculators to bank on elephant extinction.
• Large criminal syndicates (Type I speculators) operating in an oligopoly may respond to an indefinite ban by dumping their stocks or moving them to neighboring countries like Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao PDR to seek higher prices.
• If a domestic ban is perceived as finite (e.g., lasting ten years), large speculators have a strong incentive to 'bank on extinction' by increasing stockpiles and driving the species to low numbers to secure future monopoly rents.
• Private retail investors (Type II speculators) may trigger a 'fire sale'—a domino effect of stock price collapse—if they believe a ban is credible and fear being the last to sell their ivory assets.
• The legal trade in mammoth ivory poses a risk to elephant conservation because it can be used as a cover to launder illegal elephant ivory, leading the authors to suggest the Chinese government regulate or voluntarily ban mammoth ivory.
• Maintaining official government ivory stockpiles is viewed as a liability that undermines the credibility of a ban and risks leakage into the illicit market through corruption.
• To maximize law enforcement efficiency, the authors suggest targeting physical retail outlets first before shifting resources to the more nimble and concealed illegal online ivory markets.

APA

HARVEY, R., ALDEN, C., & WU, Y.-S. (n.d.). WORKING PAPER SPECULATING AN IVORY FIRE SALE: OPTIONS FOR CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC IVORY TRADE BAN. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-19-SNAP-working-paper-for-SAIIA-rev2.pdf

Chicago

HARVEY, ROSS, CHRIS ALDEN, and YU-SHAN WU. WORKING PAPER SPECULATING AN IVORY FIRE SALE: OPTIONS FOR CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC IVORY TRADE BAN. South African Institute of International Affairs, n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-19-SNAP-working-paper-for-SAIIA-rev2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=HARVEY |first1=ROSS |last2=ALDEN |first2=CHRIS |last3=WU |first3=YU-SHAN |title=WORKING PAPER SPECULATING AN IVORY FIRE SALE: OPTIONS FOR CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC IVORY TRADE BAN |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-19-SNAP-working-paper-for-SAIIA-rev2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{harveyndworking, author = {HARVEY, ROSS and ALDEN, CHRIS and WU, YU-SHAN}, title = {{WORKING PAPER SPECULATING AN IVORY FIRE SALE: OPTIONS FOR CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC IVORY TRADE BAN}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-19-SNAP-working-paper-for-SAIIA-rev2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }