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Research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) reveals that TikTok's 'original sound' feature allows terrorist propaganda to persist even after original videos are removed. The study found that audio from IS and al-Qaeda ideologues is easily discoverable and often spreads through misleading labels or integration with popular nasheeds, sometimes reaching users who do not appear to support extremist ideologies. Furthermore, the platform's algorithm was found to recommend additional violative content, including neo-Nazi propaganda, to users searching for terrorist material.

The briefing examines the resurgence of the Canadian Jewish Defense League (JDL) through its rebranded entity, Israel Now. It details how the group uses social media, specifically the 'Never Again Live' platform, to target pro-Palestinian activists through doxxing and harassment. The document highlights the group's promotion of Jewish militancy, including firearms training, and its alignment with far-right, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant rhetoric. It further notes the group's historical and contemporary links to violent extremist organizations and individuals, arguing that the Israel-Hamas conflict has provided an opportunity for the group to gain publicity and build coalitions.

The Houthi movement utilizes a diverse network of official and unofficial digital channels to project influence and solidarity with Palestinians, leveraging a 'grey area' in platform moderation and government designations to avoid total censorship. The group's messaging is amplified by Iranian state media, pro-Kremlin networks, and far-left commentators, while official English-language content is carefully curated to be more palatable to international audiences than its Arabic counterparts.

The document provides an overview of Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT), tracing the conflict from the 1921 partition and 'The Troubles' to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It details the ideologies and activities of proscribed dissident Republican groups (such as the New IRA and CIRA) and Loyalist paramilitaries (including the UVF and UDA). The guide also highlights the role of social media in amplifying sectarian hate, the emergence of anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ+ mobilisations, and the impact of foreign disinformation campaigns in exacerbating domestic divisions.

The document examines how AI technologies—specifically generative AI, large language models (LLMs), and recommender systems—can be exploited to scale disinformation, impersonate individuals via deepfakes, and automate political micro-targeting. It contrasts these risks with AI's potential to detect harmful content and enhance counter-speech. The briefing also reviews emerging regulatory frameworks in the EU, UK, and US, and discusses ethical principles like accountability and 'Constitutional AI' as means to govern these technologies.

The document argues that traditional, securitised responses to violent extremism are inadequate for the current 'post-organisational' threat environment, which is characterised by ideological hybridisation, transnational networks, and algorithmic amplification. It advocates for a 'public health approach' that targets underlying vulnerabilities through four tiers of prevention: primordial, primary, secondary, and tertiary. The playbook details 'tried and tested' models—such as digital citizenship education, counternarratives, and direct engagement—alongside innovative strategies including 'inoculation' (pre-bunking), real-time correction of narratives, and the disruption of extremist ecosystems. It concludes with practical guidance on monitoring, evaluation, safeguarding, and operational security for practitioners.

The report details a surge in targeted harassment and protests against all-ages drag events, such as Drag Queen Story Hours (DQSH), in Australia. It identifies a coalition of actors including neo-Nazis, COVID-19 conspiracy theorists, fringe politicians, and certain Christian groups who employ tactics like review-bombing, bomb threats, and the disruption of local council meetings. The document argues that this movement is heavily influenced by the importation of transphobic rhetoric and 'groomer' narratives from the United States and United Kingdom. While the mobilisers remain a fringe element of society, the report highlights a 'chilling effect' where venues and councils cancel events due to security concerns and threats of violence.

The report identifies a growing network of far-right actors, conspiracy theorists, and COVID-19 sceptics in France who are targeting all-ages drag events through online harassment and increasing in-person protests. It highlights the influence of US-based anti-drag narratives and the role of political parties like Reconquête and Rassemblement National in these efforts.

The report examines the social media strategy of the AfD in eastern Germany, finding that migration, economic grievances, and opposition to Ukraine support are the primary drivers of engagement. It highlights that the AfD views the CDU as its primary political competitor and warns that the party's growth may lead to unstable government coalitions that undermine democratic trust.

The document provides a comprehensive framework for civil society organizations to address the rise of online antisemitism. It analyzes how digital platforms—including mainstream social media and 'alt-tech' sites—amplify hate speech, conspiracy theories, and Holocaust denial. The guide examines legislative approaches in Europe and North America, contrasting content-based regulations with systemic oversight. It concludes with actionable recommendations for civil society, focusing on policy advocacy, victim support, digital citizenship education, and the establishment of cross-community coalitions to increase resilience against extremist ideologies.

The document assesses the contemporary UK landscape of hate and extremism, highlighting a shift toward 'hybridised' threats where ideological boundaries blur and online ecosystems drive real-world violence. It identifies the extreme right as the most dynamic threat, particularly among youth, while noting that Islamist extremism remains the dominant terrorism threat. The report also details the rise of anti-LGBTQ+, anti-migrant, and antisemitic hate, often amplified by international conflicts and hostile state actors from Russia, Iran, and China. To counter these, the authors propose a unified policy framework that integrates social cohesion, a rights-based definition of extremism, and a public health model of violence prevention, moving away from siloed counter-terrorism approaches.

The report identifies a deepening crisis of online antisemitism in Europe, exacerbated by the October 7 attacks, which has led to significant psychological distress and a 'chilling effect' on Jewish participation in public life. It highlights systemic failures by social media platforms to enforce terms of service, a lack of capacity within law enforcement, and limited awareness of the Digital Services Act (DSA) among Jewish civil society. The document proposes a holistic strategy including mandatory education on contemporary antisemitism, improved algorithmic transparency, the designation of trusted flaggers under the DSA, and the development of trauma-informed reporting mechanisms.

The report analyzes the online behavior of the German far right, finding that while they utilize 'alt-tech' platforms to evade moderation, they remain heavily reliant on very large online platforms (VLOPs) for reach. It highlights the central role of conspiracy theories, the opportunistic use of crises like COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and the increasing importance of audiovisual content.

The report identifies a coordinated effort by anti-abortion networks in France to use social media to spread misinformation and shocking content. It highlights the role of far-right and religious communities, the failure of platforms like Meta and YouTube to consistently enforce health misinformation policies, and the targeting of minors with distressing content.

The report analyzes anti-abortion activity across Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X in France from May 2022 to June 2023. It finds that anti-abortion mobilization relies heavily on 'dissuasive content'—including unverified testimonials and graphic imagery—and misinformation about abortion procedures. The research highlights a strong intersection between anti-abortion actors and far-right, anti-LGBTQ+, and religious communities. It specifically identifies the role of algorithmic recommendations on YouTube and Instagram Reels in serving harmful content to users, including minors, and documents the monetization of this content through Meta ads, with one page alone spending over €40,000 to reach millions of impressions, including targeting 13- to 17-year-olds with distressing imagery.

The report analyzes over 2.4 million messages from approximately 1,000 US-linked DVE accounts. It finds that while Telegram was the most active platform by volume, X generated the highest engagement. Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (REMVE) were the most active group, but Anti-Government & Anti-Authority Violent Extremists (AGAAVE) drove the most engagement. Key narratives centered on targeted hate, elections, and religion. The report highlights specific spikes in anti-migrant hate regarding Haitian migrants in Springfield, Ohio, and reactions to the arrest of Telegram CEO Pavel Durov.

The report finds that women in South African politics face significant online abuse, particularly on TikTok and X, often targeting their physical appearance, age, and intelligence. While South Africa possesses a comprehensive legal framework to combat gender-based violence, enforcement is weak. Social media platforms are criticized for inadequate moderation of non-English content and a lack of transparency in their enforcement processes. The report recommends that the South African government integrate OGBV into the remit of the National Council on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide and that platforms expand multilingual moderation to cover all 12 official languages.

The document examines how the global gaming industry's social features and design vulnerabilities are exploited by extremist and malign actors. It analyzes the applicability of major regulations like the EU's Digital Services Act and the UK's Online Safety Act to gaming companies and recommends increased data transparency, consistent policy enforcement, and 'Safety by Design' principles to mitigate harms.

The report finds that while YouTube's algorithm primarily recommends Spanish-language news to both mainstream and fringe users, it serves conspiracy content to those who seek it at a lower rate than it serves lifestyle vlogger content to mainstream users. However, the fringe account received significantly more advertisements for Facebook and education, and a small number of recommendations related to weapons and military content.

The investigation found that while gaming content dominated recommendations, YouTube's algorithm served teenage personas videos containing sexually explicit 'sex mods' in Minecraft, themes of suicide, and adult entertainment without age restrictions. Despite identical viewing habits, the male and female accounts received different numbers of videos and ads, though the report concludes that these differences are likely driven by unknown algorithmic decisions rather than gender alone, except in specific targeted advertising.