Summary
The policy brief examines the 'letting others lead' approach of European states toward the regulation of commercial military services. It contends that the perceived restrictiveness of European frameworks is an illusion, as core military tasks are routinely outsourced and regulations are often interpreted permissively or bypassed. This lack of internal rigor leads European states to relegate regulatory initiative to allies (such as the US and UK), multi-stakeholder codes of conduct, and industry self-regulation, which further fragments the global regulatory landscape and reduces accountability.
Key insights
- European states operate under a misplaced belief that their regulatory frameworks are restrictive because they prohibit commercial actors from performing 'core military/security tasks'. However, the document argues this is an illusion because tasks like transportation, image interpretation, and logistics—routinely outsourced—become core military activities when used in combat.
- In practice, European regulations are permissive and often interpreted narrowly to avoid the need for rule revisions. Examples include Germany outsourcing maintenance and repair in Afghanistan despite claiming these are 'essential military core capabilities', and Denmark contracting private security for its embassy in Kabul for tasks previously handled by special forces and intelligence services.
- Regulatory permissiveness is further increased by ad hoc adjustments and the circumvention of laws. For instance, a 1955 French law banning security guards from using armed force internationally is routinely ignored, and Sweden granted diplomatic status to security contractors in Kabul, providing them with immunity not intended for private employees.
- European states frequently delegate regulatory responsibility to other states, particularly allies. This is evidenced by a lack of clear positions on international initiatives like the UN Mercenary Convention and the Montreux Document, and by practices such as Poland relying on 'indirect contracting' or allies to manage contracts for operations in Afghanistan.
- Responsibility for regulation is also shifted to non-state stakeholders and the private industry. European states support multi-stakeholder codes of conduct, such as those from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and rely on industry self-regulation and company codes to ensure compliance with international law.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Leander, A. (2012). Letting Others Lead. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/eecca1d8-2736-42ae-afd9-af2fbcf2bd0c/Leander-Letting-Others-Lead-PRIO-Policy-Brief-7-2012B.pdf?inline=true
- Chicago
- Leander, Anna. Letting Others Lead. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/eecca1d8-2736-42ae-afd9-af2fbcf2bd0c/Leander-Letting-Others-Lead-PRIO-Policy-Brief-7-2012B.pdf?inline=true.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Leander |first1=Anna |title=Letting Others Lead |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2012 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/eecca1d8-2736-42ae-afd9-af2fbcf2bd0c/Leander-Letting-Others-Lead-PRIO-Policy-Brief-7-2012B.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{leander2012letting, author = {Leander, Anna}, title = {{Letting Others Lead}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2012}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/eecca1d8-2736-42ae-afd9-af2fbcf2bd0c/Leander-Letting-Others-Lead-PRIO-Policy-Brief-7-2012B.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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