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The document argues that government behavior, rather than just structural factors, determines the risk of civil conflict. It distinguishes between 'sins of omission'—the failure to provide political goods and protect property rights—and 'sins of commission'—the use of patronage politics to co-opt opponents. The author finds that while patronage and corruption generally increase conflict risk, they can actually enhance regime resilience in oil-rich states by bribing potential rebels. Additionally, the research highlights that single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than military or multi-party autocracies. In Nigeria, the study finds that non-state conflict is driven by political and economic competition for state patronage rather than ethnic or religious animosity.

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  • Single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than multi-party or military autocracies because their institutional setup allows for more efficient coercive strategies and the co-optation of opponents.
  • The risk of civil conflict in multi-party electoral autocracies decreases over time following a regime transition, whereas for military regimes, the risk is initially lower but increases over time.
  • High levels of government spending on political goods and the presence of trustworthy institutions are stronger predictors of civil peace than the state's extractive capacity to project force and collect revenue.
  • In oil-rich countries, political corruption can act as a tool for co-optation, where governments use oil wealth to buy off rivals and reward followers, thereby reducing the risk of conflict compared to what would be expected from corruption and oil dependence alone.
  • Non-state armed conflict in Nigeria between 1991 and 2005 was driven by political and economic factors related to the state's administrative organization and the distribution of oil wealth, rather than religious or ethnic animosity.
  • In Nigeria, areas characterized by oil production and high income levels are more likely to experience more intense non-state conflicts with higher numbers of battle deaths.
  • Government failure can be categorized into 'sins of omission,' such as failing to protect property rights, and 'sins of commission,' such as the illegitimate use of public office for personal gain through patronage politics.

Cite the original document

APA
FJELDE, H. (n.d.). Sins of Omission and Commission. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true
Chicago
FJELDE, HANNE. Sins of Omission and Commission. Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=FJELDE |first1=HANNE |title=Sins of Omission and Commission |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{fjeldendsins, author = {FJELDE, HANNE}, title = {{Sins of Omission and Commission}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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