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The document examines how the expansion of aviation security measures—driven primarily by anti-terrorism efforts following 9/11—often conflicts with fundamental human rights, including privacy and dignity. It highlights the lack of enforcement power within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the tendency for political solutions to override legal safeguards. The author argues that many current technologies, such as whole-body scanners and Passenger Name Record (PNR) transfers, may be disproportionate and lack proven effectiveness, recommending a shift toward independent evaluations and non-invasive alternatives.

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  • The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) lacks the authority to enforce global security standards because its regulations, guidelines, and Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are only recommendations, meaning contracting states are not obliged to comply.
  • Many aviation security measures are reactive and implemented in response to specific past events rather than proactive planning, such as the introduction of shoe removal after the 2001 'shoe bomber' and liquid restrictions following a 2006 attempted attack.
  • Advanced security technologies, specifically whole-body scanners, are criticized for being equivalent to virtual strip searches by revealing sensitive body areas and medical conditions, while their long-term health impacts regarding radiation remain uncertain.
  • The transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNR) from airlines to state authorities often conflicts with data-protection requirements; specifically, bilateral agreements between the EU and USA failed to provide an adequate level of data protection.
  • Norway's aviation security measures are almost entirely derived from international regulations, specifically EU legislation via the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area and participation in the Schengen Area.
  • There is a fundamental conflict between the priorities of security organs, which value surveillance, and human rights organs, which value privacy and dignity, with the author suggesting that security regimes are likely to prevail over human rights.

Cite the original document

APA
Mironenko, O. (2010). Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e512e309-3c52-41fb-88b7-641114e16f6c/Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation PRIO Policy Brief 08-2010.pdf?inline=true
Chicago
Mironenko, Olga. Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2010. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e512e309-3c52-41fb-88b7-641114e16f6c/Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation PRIO Policy Brief 08-2010.pdf?inline=true.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mironenko |first1=Olga |title=Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2010 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e512e309-3c52-41fb-88b7-641114e16f6c/Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation PRIO Policy Brief 08-2010.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mironenko2010data, author = {Mironenko, Olga}, title = {{Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2010}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/e512e309-3c52-41fb-88b7-641114e16f6c/Data Protection and Security in Civil Aviation PRIO Policy Brief 08-2010.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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