ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017

The ATT Monitor 2017 report finds that while the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has seen steady universalization, progress in public reporting is disappointing in both quantity and quality. Analysis of 2015 Annual Reports reveals significant discrepancies between reported exports and imports, with only 6% of analyzed small arms and light weapons (SALW) transactions being exactly mirrored. The report highlights a critical gap between reported implementation measures in Initial Reports and actual practice on the ground. It also introduces the 'Risk Watch' tool, which uses a typology of individual, group, institutional, and conflict violence to identify contexts where arms transfers may fuel human rights abuses.

• As of 31 May 2017, 92 countries were States Parties to the ATT, representing 48 per cent of all UN member states, though the pace of new membership slowed by more than 50 per cent compared to the previous year.
• The ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), established by CSP 2016 to support national implementation, had received approximately US$1.6 million in contributions and US$370,139 in pledges by the end of May 2017.
• Compliance with mandatory reporting is low; by 31 May 2017, only 58 of 82 required Initial Reports (72%) had been received, and only 31 of 75 expected Annual Reports (41%) were submitted by 7 June 2017.
• A cross-check of 435 SALW transactions from 17 major exporting States Parties showed that only 6% were exactly mirrored by the importing state, and 78% of reported exports had no corresponding import of a similar weapon type.
• Significant reporting discrepancies were noted between Poland and the Czech Republic; Poland reported exporting 12,210 units of various SALW to the Czech Republic, but the Czech Republic reported no SALW imports from Poland.
• Some States Parties reported 'nil' imports while other countries reported exporting arms to them; for example, Ireland reported nil imports, but Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the UK reported exports to Ireland.
• The report identifies a 'critical gap' between the implementation measures described in Initial Reports and actual practices on the ground, noting that some states signal an intent to act rather than existing practice.
• Regarding export controls, 89% of reporting States Parties indicate their national control system covers all eight categories of conventional arms under Article 2.1, but 7% claim their system lacks risk assessment processes because they are not arms-exporting states.
• The 'Risk Watch' tool uses a typology of four violence categories—Individual, Group, Institutional, and Conflict—to identify contexts of concern for arms misuse, drawing on sources like the Global Terrorism Index and the Political Terror Scale.
• The report argues that transparency is essential for preventing the diversion of arms, noting that diversion often occurs due to weak governmental structures and lack of accountability.

APA

Peace Research Institute Oslo (2017). ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4e9e3fc9-bff2-463c-ab66-4edcfe4e742d/ATT Monitor 2017.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Peace Research Institute Oslo. ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017. 2017. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4e9e3fc9-bff2-463c-ab66-4edcfe4e742d/ATT Monitor 2017.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Peace Research Institute Oslo |title=ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017 |date=11 September 2017 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4e9e3fc9-bff2-463c-ab66-4edcfe4e742d/ATT Monitor 2017.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{peaceresearchinstituteoslo2017att, author = {{Peace Research Institute Oslo}}, title = {{ATT MONITOR REPORT 2017}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4e9e3fc9-bff2-463c-ab66-4edcfe4e742d/ATT Monitor 2017.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }