What Peace for Syria?
Summary
The report analyzes the failure of diplomatic efforts in Syria, including the Geneva and Astana processes, and maps the fragmented nature of the Syrian Sunni opposition. It details how external actors—primarily Russia, Turkey, and Iran—have established spheres of influence and proxy networks that complicate a sustainable political transition. The authors argue that the peace process has been largely detached from the Syrian people, exacerbated by the rise of extremist groups, the Kurdish issue, and a severe economic crisis compounded by COVID-19.
Key insights
- The UN-led Geneva process failed to achieve a comprehensive settlement due to a power struggle between the West and Russia over the legitimacy of Bashar al-Assad, the inability of the Syrian opposition to unite, and the rise of the Islamic State.
- The Astana process shifted the peace process from an international problem to a local negotiation among 'guarantor powers' (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), effectively bypassing the Geneva talks and moving the discussion away from the removal of Bashar al-Assad.
- Russia and Iran have secured the Assad regime's survival, with Russia dominating western coastal areas like Latakia and Tartus, while Iran and Hezbollah maintain influence through local Shiite proxies.
- Turkey has transitioned from supporting proxies to direct military intervention, establishing four zones of control along the border and integrating opposition groups into the Syrian National Army (SNA) under the Syrian Interim Government (SIG).
- The Syrian Sunni opposition is deeply fractured into competing entities, including the internationally recognized but expatriate-led Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the Turkey-dependent Syrian Interim Government (SIG), and the HTS-linked Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib.
- The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, while influential in the early opposition and the National Council of Syria, failed to unify opposition groups or legitimize itself within Syria, often acting as a disrupting rather than unifying force.
- The Kurdish issue, specifically the autonomy of the PYD/YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), creates a 'demarcation line' along the Euphrates and complicates relations between the US, Turkey, and Russia.
- Syria is facing a severe economic and food crisis, with the Syrian pound devaluing by more than two-thirds by mid-2020, leading to the adoption of the Turkish lira in some areas and increased food insecurity for millions.
- The Assad regime's 'national reconciliation' process is criticized as a tool for control rather than genuine peace, requiring applicants to provide detailed information on anti-government activities and rebel networks.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Ioannou, I.-S., & Tziarras, Z. (2020). What Peace for Syria? Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1d6a8acd-2ef2-40c5-85c6-8aaa90985b15/5 2020 What Peace for Syria.pdf?inline=true
- Chicago
- Ioannou, Ioannis-Sotirios, and Zenonas Tziarras. What Peace for Syria? Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2020. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1d6a8acd-2ef2-40c5-85c6-8aaa90985b15/5 2020 What Peace for Syria.pdf?inline=true.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Ioannou |first1=Ioannis-Sotirios |last2=Tziarras |first2=Zenonas |title=What Peace for Syria? |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2020 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1d6a8acd-2ef2-40c5-85c6-8aaa90985b15/5 2020 What Peace for Syria.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{ioannou2020what, author = {Ioannou, Ioannis-Sotirios and Tziarras, Zenonas}, title = {{What Peace for Syria?}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2020}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1d6a8acd-2ef2-40c5-85c6-8aaa90985b15/5 2020 What Peace for Syria.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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