Political economy of regionalisation in Central Africa

The report analyzes the failure of regional integration in Central Africa, linking it to the 'personalisation of power' and the 'resource curse' (specifically oil). It argues that regional organisations like ECCAS and CEMAC are often used to enhance regime security rather than human security. The document examines case studies of collapsed personalised regimes (Zaire, CAR, Equatorial Guinea) and surviving ones (Cameroon, Gabon), while assessing the operational weaknesses of regional security architectures and the impact of oil booms on institutional governance.

• Regional integration in Central Africa is viewed by state leaders as an extension of domestic politics, where they balance long-term regional gains against the short-term political costs to their own survival.
• The 'personalisation of power' in the region leads to a prioritisation of regime security over human security, often resulting in post-regime instability when the central leader is removed.
• In Cameroon, oil booms have historically exacerbated poor institutional governance by funding uncompetitive state parastatals and a cumbersome bureaucracy to buy off political opponents and ensure loyalty.
• The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is operationally weak due to a lack of political will, financial resources, and the absence of a regional hegemon to enforce commitments.
• Interstate relations in Central Africa are characterized by mistrust and the 'voluntary conflict exportation' strategy, where governments destabilize neighbors to ensure their own political survival.
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) referral for the Central African Republic was interpreted as a political tool used by President François Bozizé to legitimize his power and sideline political opponents.
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) employs an opportunistic approach to regional integration, joining multiple RECs (CEEAC, SADC, COMESA, CEPGL) to garner external support and legitimacy during periods of weakness.
• The 'resource curse' in the region is not an inevitable result of abundance but is dependent on institutional governance; where accountability is low, oil booms sustain patrimonialism and corruption.
• Regional security in Central Africa is undermined by the militarisation of criminal gangs and the illicit transnational trade in weapons, which are often facilitated by porous borders.

APA

Ayangafac, C. (2008). Political economy of regionalisation in Central Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/M155FULL.PDF

Chicago

Ayangafac, Chrysantus. Political economy of regionalisation in Central Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/M155FULL.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ayangafac |first1=Chrysantus |title=Political economy of regionalisation in Central Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/M155FULL.PDF |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{ayangafac2008political, author = {Ayangafac, Chrysantus}, title = {{Political economy of regionalisation in Central Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/M155FULL.PDF}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }