A question of influence?

The report identifies a growing, commercially driven marketplace for 'influence as a service' in Kenya, where digital entrepreneurs monetise their networks to amplify political narratives. While techniques mirror global trends, the operations were predominantly indigenous. The study highlights the use of bots, astroturfing, and conspiratorial narratives—such as the 'deep state'—to undermine democratic institutions and legacy media. It warns that the integration of artificial intelligence could accelerate disinformation, creating an 'automated disinformation arms race' that threatens fragile democracies across Africa.

• Influence operations during the 2022 Kenyan elections were primarily home-grown, although they adopted techniques seen in the US, Russia, and Europe.
• The primary driver for influence operations in Kenya is commercial rather than ideological, leading to the 'commodification' of influence where hashtags and influencers are hired for a fee.
• Influence is sold as a tiered service; for example, generating a hashtag can cost between 100,000 Ksh and several million shillings, while mid-tier bloggers may earn US$2,000 to US$3,000 a day for disinformation tweets.
• The 'deep state' narrative was a central conspiratorial tool used to depict the state under the Kenyatta administration as corrupt and captured, mirroring elements of the American QAnon movement.
• Legacy media in Kenya faced direct competition from social media and was often targeted by narratives of bias, which pushed political actors to compete more aggressively on digital platforms.
• Both major political communities employed inauthentic activity, including the use of bots, sock puppets, and astroturfing to create an illusion of popular support.
• Disinformation campaigns targeted the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to undermine its legitimacy, including claims of a 'captured' commission and the use of doctored videos.
• The rise of artificial intelligence and automated responses threatens to create a 'disinformation arms race' that could outpace human verification and undermine democratic norms in Africa.

APA

Allen, K., le Roux, J., & Beti, B. (2023). A question of influence? Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-49.pdf

Chicago

Allen, Karen, Jean le Roux, and Bonface Beti. A question of influence? Institute for Security Studies, 2023. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-49.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Allen |first1=Karen |last2=le Roux |first2=Jean |last3=Beti |first3=Bonface |title=A question of influence? |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=June 2023 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-49.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{allen2023question, author = {Allen, Karen and le Roux, Jean and Beti, Bonface}, title = {{A question of influence?}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2023}, month = jun, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-49.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }