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This policy brief argues that the 2021 deadline for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to transfer primary security responsibilities to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) is unrealistic. The author contends that the transition is currently driven more by donor funding preferences than by actual security improvements on the ground. To ensure a successful transition, the brief recommends enhancing AMISOM's operational capabilities and resolving the political deadlock between the Federal Government of Somalia and its federal member states.

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  • The 2021 deadline for the phased transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is considered unrealistic and unlikely to be fully achieved.
  • The Somali National Army (SNA) lacks the necessary capacity to take over security duties, suffering from poor motivation, inadequate equipment, and a lack of proper training. While the FGS reports 22,000 SNA personnel, these numbers remain unverified.
  • A lack of political consensus regarding the National Security Architecture between the FGS and federal member states hinders the creation of an inclusive, Somali-led security infrastructure.
  • Despite AMISOM and national forces recovering over 70% of territory from al-Shabaab, the terror group remains a potent threat by adapting its asymmetrical tactics. The security environment is further complicated by the rise of clan militias and other groups, including the Islamic State.
  • The push for AMISOM's withdrawal by 2021 is driven largely by the 'politics of resourcing' and donor reticence to fund long-term peace enforcement, rather than an actual improvement in security conditions.
  • AMISOM's effectiveness is hampered by command and control issues, where troop-contributing countries sometimes interfere by giving direct instructions to sector commanders, bypassing the mission's chain of command.
  • To improve operational effectiveness, AMISOM requires a reconfiguration that includes aligning sector boundaries with regional administrative capitals, establishing a mission-wide quick reaction force, and fully staffing the Mission Operation Centre (MOC) and Mission Analysis Cell (MAC).

Cite the original document

APA
Okeke, J. M. (2019). Deadline or deadlock? AMISOM’s future in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb133.pdf
Chicago
Okeke, Jide Martyns. Deadline or deadlock? AMISOM’s future in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies, 2019. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb133.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Okeke |first1=Jide Martyns |title=Deadline or deadlock? AMISOM’s future in Somalia |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2019 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb133.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{okeke2019deadline, author = {Okeke, Jide Martyns}, title = {{Deadline or deadlock? AMISOM’s future in Somalia}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2019}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb133.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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