Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament

This research paper evaluates the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) at the end of its first term (2004–2009), analyzing its prospects for transforming from a consultative body into a full legislative assembly. The author argues that while the PAP Protocol envisions this evolution, the institution currently suffers from significant structural weaknesses, a lack of enforcement power, and a democratic deficit due to the indirect nomination of its members.

• The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) currently lacks the power to enforce its decisions, possessing only "consultative and advisory powers". Consequently, its resolutions and recommendations are not binding, and AU policy-making organs are not required to seek its input.
• The PAP faces a democratic deficit because its members are nominated by national parliaments rather than being directly elected by citizens. This arrangement compromises the independence of members, who may be recalled by their home countries and are often more likely to pursue national rather than continental agendas.
• The PAP's institutional capacity is severely limited by its lack of financial autonomy. Its budget is part of the general AU budget, meaning the PAP cannot initiate, draw up, or amend its own budget based on its specific needs.
• The PAP has demonstrated significant success in election-observation missions, specifically in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Angola (2008), which the author describes as one of its most productive activities.
• Comparing the PAP to the European Parliament (EP) reveals that the EP's transition to a legislative body was gradual, taking 21 years for direct elections and 41 years to become a full legislative body. This suggests that expecting the PAP to transform after only five years may be unrealistic.
• The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is noted as the only regional parliament in Africa with significant legislative powers, including the ability to approve the EAC budget and pass acts. However, it still faces challenges with executive dominance, as heads of state can veto its budget rejections.
• The author proposes a four-step path for the PAP's transformation: first, establishing functional cooperation with other AU organs; second, gaining budgetary control; third, developing formal oversight and control mechanisms; and fourth, implementing direct elections via universal suffrage.
• The transformation of the PAP into a legislative body would necessitate a broader overhaul of the AU's governance architecture, including the creation or enhancement of an executive and a judiciary (such as the African Court of Justice) to ensure a balance of power.

APA

Mpanyane, S. (2009). Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper181.pdf

Chicago

Mpanyane, Saki. Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament. Institute for Security Studies, 2009. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper181.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mpanyane |first1=Saki |title=Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=March 2009 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper181.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mpanyane2009transformation, author = {Mpanyane, Saki}, title = {{Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2009}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper181.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }