Force Africaine en Attente

The document provides an update on the African Standby Force (ASF), a multidisciplinary force designed for rapid deployment in peace support operations across Africa. While significant progress has been made in developing doctrine, standard operating procedures, and training, the author notes that the project has failed to meet its original ambitious timelines. Key obstacles include severe logistical deficits, a lack of leadership and staffing at the African Union (AU) level, and a heavy reliance on external funding and technical expertise from international donors. The paper details the varying levels of readiness across five African regions and argues for a more integrated partnership between the AU and the UN to ensure sustainable security operations.

• The African Standby Force (ASF) is designed as a multidisciplinary force comprising civil and military components stationed in their home countries, ready for rapid deployment to support peace operations, including preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace consolidation, and humanitarian assistance.
• The ASF operational structure is based on six conflict scenarios with varying deployment timelines, ranging from 14 days for urgent interventions in cases of genocide to 90 days for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions.
• The AU failed to fully complete Phase 1 of the ASF implementation by the June 30, 2006 deadline, and it is considered highly unlikely that the more complex capabilities required for Phase 2 (due June 30, 2010) will be achieved without increased member state commitment and AU leadership.
• Logistics remain a critical failure point for the ASF; the lack of a finalized continental logistics system and the high cost of outsourcing—exemplified by the $21 million contract for AMIS in Darfur—hinder rapid deployment capabilities.
• The AU and UN have established a complementary relationship where the AU typically deploys first to stabilize a situation, subsequently transitioning the mission to a more robust UN operation.
• The ASF suffers from a lack of internal AU leadership and staffing; the AU Planning Element (PLANELM) has remained severely understaffed, growing from one to only five members over several years despite a requirement of 15.
• Regional progress is uneven: West Africa (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa (SADC) have made considerable strides, while East Africa was slowed by the lack of a proper regional mechanism, and Central Africa (ECCAS) is hampered by chronic resource shortages and dependence on external aid.
• There is a concerning trend of 'donor scramble' and over-reliance on foreign experts, where expatriate advisors from European countries often hold more influence and resources than their African counterparts, potentially undermining African ownership of the project.
• Financial sustainability is a major hurdle, as the AU relies heavily on the EU's Africa Peace Facility (which provided nearly €300 million up to 2006) and G8 commitments, while member state contributions to the AU budget are often inconsistent.

APA

Cilliers, J. (2008). Force Africaine en Attente. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf

Chicago

Cilliers, Jakkie. Force Africaine en Attente. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Cilliers |first1=Jakkie |title=Force Africaine en Attente |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=March 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{cilliers2008force, author = {Cilliers, Jakkie}, title = {{Force Africaine en Attente}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }