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This research paper by the Institute for Security Studies provides a progress update on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), a multidisciplinary force designed to enable the African Union (AU) to respond to conflicts through peace support missions and interventions.

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  • The African Standby Force (ASF) is designed as a multidisciplinary force comprising civil and military components stationed in their home countries, intended for rapid deployment across Africa and potentially beyond.
  • The ASF operational structure is based on six conflict scenarios with varying deployment timelines, ranging from 14 days for urgent interventions (such as genocide) to 90 days for complex multidimensional peace support missions.
  • The AU established a two-phase implementation plan; however, Phase 1 (ending June 30, 2006) was not fully achieved, and Phase 2 (by June 30, 2010) is considered unlikely to meet its targets without increased member state commitment and AU leadership.
  • Logistics remains a critical failure point for the ASF, with significant challenges in establishing a continental system of military depots and a heavy reliance on expensive private contractors for transport and maintenance.
  • The AU and UN have adopted a model where the AU deploys first to stabilize a situation and create conditions for a subsequent, more complex UN multidimensional operation, though this risks exhausting ASF capacities.
  • The Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept, intended for 14-day interventions, lacks consensus on command and control, with AU officials favoring a centralized force and experts favoring a decentralized regional approach.
  • Financial sustainability is a major obstacle, as the AU relies heavily on external partners like the EU's Africa Peace Facility, and member states have not consistently paid their contributions to the AU budget.
  • There is a perceived lack of African ownership in some regions, where foreign 'advisors' from donor countries often outnumber African officers in planning and training structures and exert significant influence over decisions.
  • Regional progress is uneven: West Africa (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa (SADC) have made considerable strides, while East Africa was slowed by the lack of a proper regional mechanism, and Central Africa (ECCAS) suffers from chronic resource shortages and poor AU harmonization.

Cite the original document

APA
Cilliers, J. (2008). Force Africaine en Attente. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf
Chicago
Cilliers, Jakkie. Force Africaine en Attente. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Cilliers |first1=Jakkie |title=Force Africaine en Attente |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=March 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{cilliers2008force, author = {Cilliers, Jakkie}, title = {{Force Africaine en Attente}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper160french.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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