“We can’t eat the constitution”

This research paper argues that Burundi's transition to peace is precarious because the focus has remained on political power-sharing and elections while neglecting the socio-economic reconstruction outlined in Protocol IV of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accords. The author asserts that failure to address structural causes of conflict—specifically extreme poverty, land scarcity, and unequal resource distribution—could lead the country back into a 'conflict trap'.

• The author argues that focusing solely on the ethnic composition of state institutions ignores the structural causes of conflict, specifically the unequal distribution of and access to resources. The paper asserts that the durability of peace depends on moving from peace-making to peace-building by addressing human development and extreme poverty.
• Implementation of Protocol IV of the Arusha Accords, which covers reconstruction and development, is described as the 'litmus test' for the transitional government. This protocol includes the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and 'sinistrés' (displaced and returnees), physical and political reconstruction, and economic and social development.
• The process of resettling refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is hindered by institutional duplication and political power-sharing. The National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Sinistrés (CNRS) and the Ministry of Reintegration and Resettlement of Displaced and Repatriated Refugees (MRRDR) have synonymous functions, a result of a political compromise between the FRODEBU and G10 parties.
• International aid to Burundi is criticized for being trapped in a 'humanitarian emergency' paradigm, focusing on short-term relief rather than long-term reconstruction. The author notes a gap between donor pledges and actual disbursements, citing that the 2004 UN Consolidated Appeal received only 45 percent of required funds.
• Land access is identified as the primary potential source of future instability due to extreme population density and a history of expropriation. The 1986 Land Code and proposed updates to the Land Code create conflict, particularly for 'old caseload' refugees (those who fled in 1972) who may lose claims if the prescription period for land ownership is reduced from 30 to 15 years.
• Women in Burundi face severe structural inequalities and violence. While the Arusha accords recommend women hold 30 percent of parliamentary positions, the author notes a lack of implementation. Furthermore, rape is used as an instrument of war, is not clearly defined in the legal code, and is often handled by traditional mediators who suggest marriage between the victim and perpetrator.
• Burundi's economy is characterized by extreme poverty and an unsustainable debt burden. As of 2002, external debt arrears were US$148.5 million, and total debt exceeded 180 percent of GDP. The author warns that the IMF and World Bank's push for liberalisation and privatisation through the HIPC initiative may facilitate 'disaster capitalism' and land-grabs by the powerful.

APA

Jooma, M. B. (2005). “We can’t eat the constitution”. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER106.PDF

Chicago

Jooma, Mariam Bibi. “We can’t eat the constitution”. Institute for Security Studies, 2005. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER106.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Jooma |first1=Mariam Bibi |title=“We can’t eat the constitution” |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=May 2005 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER106.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{jooma2005cant, author = {Jooma, Mariam Bibi}, title = {{“We can’t eat the constitution”}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2005}, month = may, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER106.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }