Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa

This conference report, compiled by the Institute for Security Studies, examines the political dynamics and institutional structures that influence decision-making within the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as their interactions with the European Union (EU).

• The African Union (AU) is structured as an intergovernmental organisation that prioritises state sovereignty, lacking the supranational decision-making authority found in the European Union. Its organs, including the AU Commission, primarily reflect the national interests of member state representatives and the Commission itself largely functions as a secretariat.
• African common positions in international negotiations are complex and susceptible to change because they are not legally binding. These positions are shaped by national interests, the agenda of the Chairperson, external actor influence, and linguistic or geographic sensitivities.
• The 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations demonstrated a lack of unity among African states, where internal regional and national disputes—such as the conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Nile basin and South Sudan's independence—marginalised the Africa Group's collective position.
• The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are viewed as a failure in terms of regional integration because the EU negotiated separately with regions, ignoring the multi-membership of African countries and the limited negotiating capacity of the RECs.
• Regional Economic Communities (RECs) face a conflict between supranationalism and national interests, with member states reluctant to grant them independence. Many RECs suffer from underdeveloped staffing, a lack of regional funding, and an over-reliance on external actors for strategic issues.
• Peacekeeping interventions in Africa, such as the mission in Somalia, have sometimes been driven by financial and political promises from external actors like the US and UN, leading the AU and IGAD to commit to mandates that were inadequate or lacked a realistic peace process.
• The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is described as one of the poorest and weakest RECs, which paradoxically made it a convenient cover for external actors to influence peace negotiations, such as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan.
• To improve efficiency and the ability to set regional agendas, the report suggests the creation of an 'African G'—an informal, exclusive group of like-minded states with the capacity and willingness to build consensus outside the rigid structures of the AU and RECs.

APA

Hoste, J.-C., & Leriba, A. A. (2011). Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf

Chicago

Hoste, Jean-Christophe, and Andrew Anderson Leriba. Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2011. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Hoste |first1=Jean-Christophe |last2=Leriba |first2=Andrew Anderson |title=Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2011 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{hoste2011dynamics, author = {Hoste, Jean-Christophe and Leriba, Andrew Anderson}, title = {{Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2011}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }