Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa

The report examines the tension between national sovereignty and supranationalism in African decision-making, highlighting the role of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It analyzes the complexities of forming 'African Common Positions', using the 2009 Copenhagen climate negotiations as a case study, and critiques the EU's approach to partnership, specifically regarding Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The document also explores security architectures in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, noting the influence of external actors and the challenges of multi-membership in regional bodies.

• The African Union (AU) operates as an intergovernmental organisation that prioritises state sovereignty over supranational authority, meaning its organs, including the AU Commission, largely reflect the national interests of member states rather than possessing independent decision-making power.
• Developing a sustainable 'African Common Position' is hindered by the need to reconcile the national interests of 53 member states, linguistic and geographic sensitivities, and the fact that these positions are not legally binding, making them susceptible to change.
• The 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations revealed a lack of unity among African states, where internal regional conflicts—such as the dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over the Nile basin and South Sudanese independence—interfered with the continent's collective bargaining position.
• The European Union's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are viewed as poorly conceived because the EU negotiated with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that lacked the necessary maturity and negotiating capacity, while ignoring regional dynamics and the issue of multi-membership.
• Regional Economic Communities (RECs) face operational inefficiencies due to 'bureaucratic capture' within their secretariats, an over-reliance on external funding for strategic issues, and a reluctance by member states to empower these organisations independently.
• External actors, including the US and EU, influence African regional decision-making through financial and political promises, sometimes leading the AU and RECs to commit to missions, such as the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, for which they were ill-equipped.
• The 'spaghetti bowl' of overlapping memberships in various RECs creates a conflict of logic and values, hindering the ability of these organisations to serve as effective 'building blocks' for the African Union.
• To improve efficiency and consensus-building, the report suggests the creation of an 'African G'—an informal, exclusive group of like-minded states with the capacity and willingness to set regional agendas, moving away from the rigid requirements of total regional inclusiveness.

APA

Hoste, J.-C., & Leriba, A. A. (2011). Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf

Chicago

Hoste, Jean-Christophe, and Andrew Anderson Leriba. Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2011. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Hoste |first1=Jean-Christophe |last2=Leriba |first2=Andrew Anderson |title=Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2011 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{hoste2011dynamics, author = {Hoste, Jean-Christophe and Leriba, Andrew Anderson}, title = {{Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2011}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/DynamicsDecisionMakingAfrica.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }