chap-8-94c09e4e6733f6fc.pdf

This report chapter examines 'Operation Favour', a Rhodesian counter-insurgency initiative to establish Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) as a local self-protection militia. The program aimed to stabilize rural Tribal Trust Lands and secure political support for the Internal Settlement government, though it faced significant challenges including poor training, urban recruitment issues, and political instability.

• Operation Favour was designed to create a local black militia to protect rural populations from insurgent intimidation, based on the theory that security forces cannot win 'hearts and minds' if they cannot provide physical security. The program evolved from an 'apolitical' pilot in Msana Tribal Trust Land in early 1978 into the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs), later named 'Pfumo re Vanhu' (Spear of the People) in Shona and 'Umkonto wa Bantu' in Ndebele.
• The SFA scheme was heavily utilized as a political tool to support the Internal Settlement Agreement of 3 March 1978 and the April 1979 elections. It was used to create the appearance of insurgent defections to the government and to secure block votes for Bishop Muzorewa. While General Walls claimed over 2,000 terrorists had joined, the document states a maximum of 50 actually availed themselves of the amnesty offer, with the rest being SFAs.
• A critical failure in the program was the decision to recruit unemployed urban blacks ('townies') to fill ranks quickly for the April 1979 elections instead of recruiting locals from the Tribal Trust Lands. These recruits received only rudimentary four-week training and their presence in rural areas led to an increase in murder, rape, and general crime.
• The program experienced significant internal friction and eventual collapse of certain factions. SFAs loyal to ZANU (Sithole) faced issues of rapacious behavior in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land and eventually engaged in armed resistance against the government at Nembudzia on 20 June 1979, resulting in 183 deaths.
• The administration of Operation Favour shifted from Special Branch to the Army on 1 July 1979. This transfer weakened the direct political links between the SFAs and their leaders and replaced local cash procurement of supplies with standard Army logistics, which had previously stimulated the local economy.
• By the time of the ceasefire following the Lancaster House talks, the SFA establishment had reached approximately 19,000 members with a total budget outlay of Rh 20 million. Despite this, the forces were not strong enough to protect the population from ZANLA and ZPRA attacks once the regular Security Forces were restricted to their bases.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). chap-8-94c09e4e6733f6fc.pdf. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 8.PDF

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. chap-8-94c09e4e6733f6fc.pdf. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 8.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=chap-8-94c09e4e6733f6fc.pdf |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 8.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndchap894c09e4e6733f6fcpdf, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{chap-8-94c09e4e6733f6fc.pdf}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 8.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }