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This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies provides an update on the integration of the army and the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process in the Democratic Republic of Congo as of September 2005. It details the FARDC's strategic plan to establish a new armed force, the roles of various national and international coordinating bodies, and the significant logistical and financial challenges—including 'ghost soldiers' and unpaid salaries—that threaten the stability of the transition and the upcoming 2006 elections.

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  • In May 2005, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) released a strategic plan for army integration divided into three stages: creating light infantry brigades for the elections, forming a rapid reaction unit, and establishing the main defence force by 2010.
  • The military integration process involves a five-step sequence: a census of forces, disarmament at assembly points, selection at orientation centres, mixing and training at six Centres de Brassage (CBRs) into brigades of 4,200 troops, and final deployment. The goal is to integrate 12 brigades by December 12, 2005.
  • A military census conducted by South Africa and the Structure for Military Integration (SMI) across six provinces and Kinshasa revealed that 30% to 40% of soldiers listed as FARDC members do not exist, referred to as 'ghost' soldiers.
  • Coordination of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been hampered by a lack of political will within the transitional government, insufficient funds, and the failure of the MONUC SSR architecture, which was viewed as too complex and lacking national ownership.
  • Severe living conditions in brassage centres led to significant desertions; between March and August 2005, approximately 2,500 out of 6,000 integrated troops deserted due to appalling conditions.
  • The failure to pay military salaries, currently at US $10 per month, has driven soldiers toward banditry and violence against civilians. While the IMF opposes increases due to budgetary concerns and 'ghost soldiers', the census results suggest resources could be freed to double salaries.
  • Critical shortages of equipment and transport threaten the deployment of integrated brigades. Aside from the first and third brigades, most troops lack relevant arms, and the DRC Minister of Defence has stated that unequipped brigades will not be deployed.
  • Recent instability in the east, including threats by General Nkunda to re-invade, has caused further desertions, such as the disappearance of 1,000 combatants from the 2nd Mixed Battallion near Burungu on August 31.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). DRC update 2_09_2005. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/050902DRC.PDF
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. DRC update 2_09_2005. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/050902DRC.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=DRC update 2_09_2005 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/050902DRC.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesnddrc, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{DRC update 2\_09\_2005}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/050902DRC.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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