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Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab

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This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies examines how competing local and regional interests regarding the formation of the Jubaland state in Somalia may undermine the fight against Al-Shabaab. It details the tensions between the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) and regional actors, specifically Kenya and Ethiopia, over the legitimacy and representivity of the process in Kismayo and surrounding regions.

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  • The formation of the Jubaland state—comprising the Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba regions—is a point of contention that could derail progress against Al-Shabaab. While the liberation of Kismayo in October 2012 was a symbolic victory, subsequent struggles for control of the city and its environs persist.
  • The Somalia Federal Government (SFG) views the Jubaland process as unconstitutional and unilateral because it is not driven by Mogadishu. The SFG prefers a model where it facilitates the formation of mandated local administrations, as seen in the Beled Weyne and Baydhabo regions.
  • Regional interests drive the creation of Jubaland, with Kenya seeking a buffer zone to prevent Al-Shabaab incursions following a 2011 military incursion. Ethiopia also seeks a local administration that is not sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). These common interests led to the 2012 IGAD Grand Stabilisation Plan for South Central Somalia.
  • Internal Somali tensions center on clan representivity and the fear of dominance by the Ogaden sub-clan. The SFG warns that failure to ensure shared governance among the Darood, Hawiye, and Dir clans could fuel grievances and undermine national reconciliation.
  • Political instability and the SFG's struggle to assert authority over the Kismayo process create opportunities for Al-Shabaab. The group's ability to quickly seize Huddur, the capital of the Bakool region, following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops illustrates its capacity to exploit weaknesses.

Cite the original document

APA
Atta-Asamoah, A. (n.d.). Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tensions-over-the-jubaland-process-in-somalia-could-embolden-al-shabaab
Chicago
Atta-Asamoah, Andrews. Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab. Institute for Security Studies, n.d. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tensions-over-the-jubaland-process-in-somalia-could-embolden-al-shabaab.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Atta-Asamoah |first1=Andrews |title=Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |url=https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tensions-over-the-jubaland-process-in-somalia-could-embolden-al-shabaab |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{attaasamoahndtensions, author = {Atta-Asamoah, Andrews}, title = {{Tensions over the Jubaland process in Somalia could embolden Al-Shabaab}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tensions-over-the-jubaland-process-in-somalia-could-embolden-al-shabaab}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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