Less confrontation, more cooperation
Summary
The document argues that while the EU CBAM is essential for preventing carbon leakage and achieving the EU's 2030 climate goals, its current perception as a unilateral and protectionist tool risks triggering trade conflicts and undermining multilateral climate cooperation. It examines specific reactions in China, Russia, and Ukraine, highlighting concerns over sovereignty, WTO compliance, and the use of revenues. The authors recommend that the EU shift its narrative to focus strictly on carbon leakage, recycle CBAM revenues back to affected low- and middle-income countries, and engage in deep bilateral diplomacy and climate partnerships to foster global cooperation.
Key insights
- The EU requires a functional CBAM to achieve its 2030 climate target of at least -55% GHG emissions because existing carbon leakage protections, specifically the free allocation of emission allowances, will become insufficient by the second half of the 2020s.
- The announcement of the CBAM has already created positive ripple effects by encouraging trading partners to consider their own carbon pricing and industrial decarbonization to maintain EU market access.
- Trading partners frequently perceive the CBAM as a protectionist measure or 'green protectionism' designed to advantage EU industry rather than a genuine climate tool, a view exacerbated by proposals to use revenues for the EU budget.
- China views the CBAM as a violation of the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and a threat to its sovereignty, with some experts predicting it will lead to trade retaliation or legal disputes.
- Russia is highly vulnerable to the CBAM due to its lack of national carbon regulation and high exports of carbon-intensive goods; while some elites suggest domestic carbon pricing, influential lobby groups like the RUIE advocate for WTO appeals.
- In Ukraine, the CBAM has shifted climate policy from the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Environment to include the Ministry of Economy and industry, leading to a declared long-term goal of carbon neutrality.
- To ensure WTO compatibility and international acceptance, the EU should recycle the estimated 5 to 14 billion euro in annual CBAM revenues to support low-carbon transitions in affected low- and middle-income countries.
- The authors recommend that the EU avoid framing the CBAM as a tool to nudge other countries' climate ambition, as this contradicts the Paris Agreement's bottom-up approach of nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
- Specific design recommendations to increase acceptability include exempting Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and low-income Small Island Developing States (SIDS), limiting the scope to imports only, and implementing a 3-to-5-year pilot phase.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Gläser, A., & Caspar, O. (n.d.). Less confrontation, more cooperation. Germanwatch. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Less%20confrontation%2C%20more%20cooperation%20%28EN%29.pdf
- Chicago
- Gläser, Anne, and Oldag Caspar. Less confrontation, more cooperation. Germanwatch, n.d. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Less%20confrontation%2C%20more%20cooperation%20%28EN%29.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Gläser |first1=Anne |last2=Caspar |first2=Oldag |title=Less confrontation, more cooperation |publisher=Germanwatch |url=https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Less%20confrontation%2C%20more%20cooperation%20%28EN%29.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document gerwat-001922)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{glserndless, author = {Gläser, Anne and Caspar, Oldag}, title = {{Less confrontation, more cooperation}}, institution = {Germanwatch}, url = {https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Less%20confrontation%2C%20more%20cooperation%20%28EN%29.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document gerwat-001922} }
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