Cutting Special Interests by the Roots: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon

The paper examines the political agency of 'farmer mayors' in the Brazilian Amazon before and after the 2004 implementation of the PPCDAm. Using a regression discontinuity design, the authors find that prior to the policy, municipalities governed by farmers had significantly higher deforestation rates, CO2e emissions, and land-related conflicts. After the PPCDAm's introduction of real-time satellite monitoring (DETER), these effects largely disappeared, suggesting that tighter enforcement reduced the electoral and personal returns of promoting deforestation.

• Before the implementation of the PPCDAm, municipalities governed by farmer mayors experienced significantly higher deforestation rates compared to those governed by non-farmers. The preferred specification indicates these municipalities deforested 170 square kilometers more, representing nearly a threefold increase from the average rate of the period.
• The effect of farmer mayors on deforestation and direct CO2e emissions disappeared after the introduction of the PPCDAm in November 2004, with point estimates becoming statistically insignificant.
• The deforestation associated with farmer mayors occurred almost exclusively outside of protected areas and primarily involved the conversion of forests into pasture rather than croplands.
• Prior to the PPCDAm, electing a farmer mayor led to a statistically significant increase in the amount of federal matching grants directed toward agriculture, specifically an increase of approximately R$48 per capita. This effect was not present for other sectors like health or education, nor did it persist after the policy change.
• Farmer mayors were associated with higher levels of land-related violence and conflict before the PPCDAm. Specifically, the number of conflicts increased by 3.38 and the number of murders increased substantially, though these effects were not observed after the policy was implemented.
• The PPCDAm reduced the electoral advantage of farmer politicians. While farmer mayors in the 2001-2004 term were 22-24 percentage points more likely to see a farmer elected in the subsequent election, this effect declined to 12-13 percentage points for those governing in the 2005-2008 term.
• The authors argue that the PPCDAm created a 'multiplier effect' by increasing the costs and reducing the returns of illegal deforestation, thereby eliminating the incentives for local politicians to cater to pro-deforestation special interests.

APA

Bragança, A., & Dahis, R. (2021). Cutting Special Interests by the Roots: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon. Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WP004-Cutting-Special-Interests-by-the-Roots.pdf

Chicago

Bragança, Arthur, and Ricardo Dahis. Cutting Special Interests by the Roots: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon. Climate Policy Initiative, 2021. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WP004-Cutting-Special-Interests-by-the-Roots.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bragança |first1=Arthur |last2=Dahis |first2=Ricardo |title=Cutting Special Interests by the Roots: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon |publisher=Climate Policy Initiative |date=9 July 2021 |url=https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WP004-Cutting-Special-Interests-by-the-Roots.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bragana2021cutting, author = {Bragança, Arthur and Dahis, Ricardo}, title = {{Cutting Special Interests by the Roots: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon}}, institution = {Climate Policy Initiative}, year = {2021}, month = jul, url = {https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WP004-Cutting-Special-Interests-by-the-Roots.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }