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The report finds a significant gap between where VCM projects are located and where the managing companies are based, with a strong prevalence of companies from wealthy countries operating in less affluent regions, particularly in Africa. This disparity, combined with a lack of financial transparency, raises concerns that the VCM may not be effectively channeling funds to intended beneficiaries in developing nations.

The 2024 update study by Perspectives Climate Group finds that while CAR, Verra, and ACR have improved their grievance processes since 2023, significant shortcomings persist across all analysed VCM programmes. Key issues include limited accessibility, lack of independent review guardrails, and a general absence of detailed potential remedies. The report specifically highlights the case of the Amerindian Peoples’ Association (APA) in Guyana under the ART mechanism, which was dismissed on formal grounds, illustrating the risks of ad hoc procedural changes and biased reviewer appointments. The study concludes that most VCM mechanisms remain insufficient in providing a fair, predictable, and independent path to redress for affected stakeholders.

The report highlights a surplus of approximately 829 million carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market (VCM), with renewable energy (RE) projects accounting for 35% of all project types. It argues that large-scale, grid-connected RE projects are generally non-additional because they are economically feasible without carbon credit revenues. The document traces this issue back to lax methodologies from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), specifically methodology ACM0002, which has been adopted by VCM standards like Verra and Gold Standard. The report also notes human rights concerns, including forced displacements linked to large hydroelectric dams. Furthermore, it observes a trend of anonymous retirement for 89.9% of RE credits, suggesting buyers are aware of their low quality but purchase them due to low cost. The report warns that the transition of CDM projects to the Paris Agreement's Article 6 mechanism risks flooding new markets with low-quality credits.

The document asserts that UN REDD+ was not designed as a market mechanism and lacks the necessary requirements for additionality, permanence, and robust quantification to qualify as high-quality carbon credits under Article 6.2. It highlights that while ITMOs have stronger reporting and anti-double-counting rules, neither system provides sufficient third-party verification or monitoring after activity conclusion. The author concludes that forest-related activities are ill-suited for offsetting due to inflated baselines and risks of non-permanence, urging a shift toward non-market-based financing.

The report finds that most voluntary carbon market standards have inadequate or non-existent grievance mechanisms, leaving local communities vulnerable. While Gold Standard and the Green Climate Fund's Independent Redress Mechanism are identified as best practices, others like the Global Carbon Council lack any mechanism, and standards such as Verra, CAR, ACR, and ART suffer from shortcomings in accessibility, transparency, and independence.

The author warns that a rightward political shift in the EU and UK could lead to the rollback of climate regulations and the weakening of the European Green Deal. While EU citizens express high levels of concern for climate change, competing priorities like security and healthcare may lead them to vote for parties hostile to green policies. The text urges activists to combat political apathy and maintain climate action on the political agenda even if climate-skeptical forces gain power.

Carbon Market Watch calls for the Social Climate Fund to explicitly prohibit any investment in fossil fuel-based technologies, including 'low(er) carbon' alternatives like efficient gas boilers, to avoid locking low-income groups into long-term fossil fuel use and to prevent environmental degradation.

Carbon Market Watch urges the UN Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to reject current drafts of the appeal and grievance processes and the sustainable development tool, arguing they contain insufficient human rights safeguards and create barriers to redress for affected communities.

The document outlines a detailed schedule of EU ETS and CBAM milestones from 2024 to 2034. Key developments include a shrinking emissions cap, the phase-out of free allowances for aviation, the gradual integration of shipping and municipal waste incineration, and the phased implementation of CBAM. It also details the rollout of the ETS for buildings and road transport (ETS2) and the associated Social Climate Fund, alongside various European Commission reviews of the ETS Directive and Market Stability Reserve.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the draft Article 6.4 sustainable development tool prioritizes national legal requirements over international standards, which undermines the mandate for robust social and environmental safeguards. The organization calls for a structured consultation of at least one month with rights-holders, including Indigenous Peoples, and recommends that the tool mandate the application of safeguard criteria rather than making them optional. Key concerns include the artificial time boundary of monitoring impacts only during the crediting period and the limitation of recognizing Indigenous legal systems only when they are consistent with national legislation.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the draft appeal and grievance processes for the Article 6.4 mechanism are insufficient and not ready for adoption. The organization recommends a structured consultation period of at least one month and suggests using the Green Climate Fund's Independent Redress Mechanism as a model for accessibility, legitimacy, and rights compatibility. Key criticisms include the imposition of appeal and grievance fees, restrictive eligibility criteria for appellants and grievants, limited language options (English only), and a lack of retaliation safeguards.

Carbon Market Watch (CMW) argues for increased stringency in the Article 6.4 mechanism, specifically regarding the permanence of carbon removals and the accountability of project participants. CMW proposes a minimum 100-year monitoring period for removals, the removal of options to cease monitoring based on vague evidence, and the implementation of a reversal risk assessment tool grounded in peer-reviewed science. The response also suggests a fee-based system to fund long-term monitoring and the ability to permanently ban participants who violate human rights or repeatedly cause avoidable reversals.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the SBTi Board of Trustees' decision to recognize carbon credits for abating scope 3 emissions violates scientific principles and governance processes. The organization claims this flexibility allows companies to appear climate-positive on paper while continuing to emit greenhouse gases, potentially dismantling the mitigation hierarchy that prioritizes deep internal emission reductions. Carbon Market Watch calls for the retraction of the decision, a public analysis of evidence regarding environmental attribute certificates, and a review of the SBTi's board delegation process.

The report argues that Occidental Petroleum's (Oxy) climate strategy is misaligned with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement. It finds that Oxy's net-zero targets are inadequate, focusing primarily on scope 1 and 2 emissions while ignoring the vast majority of its carbon footprint in scope 3. The analysis highlights a heavy overreliance on unproven direct air capture (DAC) technology, which the report claims is used as a 'licence to pollute' and a mechanism to prolong oil and gas extraction through enhanced oil recovery (EOR). The report further asserts that Oxy's 'net-zero oil' claims are scientifically invalid and that its lobbying efforts for government subsidies for carbon removals contradict its public climate commitments.

The Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2024 finds that the median absolute emissions reduction commitment for 51 assessed companies is only 30% by 2030, falling short of the 43%-48% reduction required by the IPCC. The report criticizes the heavy reliance on 'questionable solutions' such as carbon offsets, insetting, and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) to mask a lack of genuine decarbonization. It specifically highlights a 'Scope 3 loophole' in the VCMI framework that could allow companies to use credits for up to 50% of their annual Scope 3 emissions. The document advocates for 'beyond value chain mitigation' (BVCM) and calls for the European Union to ban all compensation claims and for the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) to prohibit the use of carbon credits to meet targets.

The 2024 Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor finds that while corporate climate targets are gradually improving, they remain largely insufficient to align with a 1.5°C pathway. The median 2030 emission reduction commitment for the 51 assessed companies is only 30-33% of full value chain emissions, falling short of the 43-48% required globally. The report highlights a critical lack of depth in scope 3 targets and warns that proposed flexibility mechanisms, such as the VCMI beta Scope 3 Flexibility Claim, could effectively nullify these commitments. It also identifies an over-reliance on 'false solutions' like bioenergy, carbon capture, and land-based carbon dioxide removals (CDR), particularly in the agrifood and fashion sectors. The authors argue for a transition from voluntary initiatives to formal accountability through mandatory regulation and accredited verification.

The guide establishes a methodology for assessing corporate climate responsibility across four key areas: emissions tracking and disclosure, target setting, emission reduction measures, and responsibility for unabated and residual emissions. It emphasizes alignment with 1.5°C-compatible pathways, the necessity of covering all emission scopes (including Scope 3), and the distinction between genuine emission reductions and misleading offsetting or 'insetting' claims. The document provides specific benchmarks for various industrial sectors and detailed criteria for high-integrity renewable electricity procurement and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies.

The report evaluates the Paris 2024 climate strategy, noting that while efforts in construction and food supply are robust, other sectors like transport and energy lack transparency and detailed methodology. It criticizes the evolution of public claims from 'carbon neutrality' to 'climate positive' as misleading and highlights a lack of transparency in carbon credit purchases. The authors argue that future games must downscale or decentralize to align with the 1.5°C goal and should avoid partnering with companies whose climate pathways are incompatible with the Paris Agreement.

The report analyzes the Paris 2024 climate strategy, noting that while efforts in construction and food procurement are robust, there is significant opacity regarding carbon credit purchases, energy sourcing, and the overall carbon budget. It criticizes the evolution of public communication from 'carbon neutrality' to 'climate positive' as misleading and highlights the incompatibility of many official sponsors with the Paris Agreement. The document argues that incremental improvements are insufficient and proposes a radical redesign of the Olympic model, such as distributing events globally to reduce international air travel and infrastructure needs.

The EU's Carbon Removals Certification Framework (CRCF) is criticized for failing to mandate 'corresponding adjustments,' allowing both companies and countries to claim the same emissions reductions. This 'double counting' risks displacing necessary climate action and contradicts the EU's own international stance on additionality and the rules of the Paris Agreement's Article 6.