Search Climate Insights Directory

The document reports on a November 2008 conference regarding regional integration in southern Africa. It argues that while EPAs have contributed to the fragmentation of regional economic bodies, they have also forced a necessary debate on the inefficiency of overlapping memberships in regional economic communities (RECs). The report notes a shift in preference away from linear integration models (like customs unions) toward simpler free trade agreements (FTAs) and infrastructure development. It specifically examines the roles of SADC, COMESA, and the EAC, as well as the Tripartite Alliance and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

This policy briefing evaluates the feasibility of establishing a regional stabilisation fund for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to counter revenue volatility. The author argues that such a fund is inappropriate due to the differing sources and scales of revenue volatility among member states and a lack of historical precedent for regional stabilisation funds. Instead, the document recommends revising the SACU revenue-sharing formula and implementing country-level fiscal instruments.

In this address, Ebrahim Ebrahim discusses the evolving nature of global conflict, noting that climate change and resource scarcity are increasing tensions. He argues that Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) is often under-resourced and suggests that lasting peace requires sustained security, broad-based social participation, and home-grown solutions. He highlights South Africa's commitment to peace support through the African Union and SADC, and advocates for South-South cooperation via the G77 plus China to secure the financial resources and technology transfer necessary for effective PCRD.

The report examines the systemic and internal obstacles facing opposition political parties in southern Africa, highlighting how dominant-party systems, state repression, and internal fragmentation undermine democratic accountability. It analyzes specific country cases—including Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe—to illustrate the 'politics of incumbency' and the critical need for opposition parties to engage with civil society and reform internal governance to achieve democratic consolidation.

Lesotho received an overall 'orange minus' rating, indicating that while some progress has been made in establishing legal and policy frameworks, actual implementation remains weak and activities are not clearly linked to the APRM process.

The document examines how the BLNS countries are constrained by South Africa's regional dominance and the SACU common tariff. It highlights a critical vulnerability: because BLNS government revenues rely heavily on the SACU customs pool, South African trade liberalisation could decimate their budgets. While some scenarios show welfare gains—particularly for Swaziland's sugar exports to the EU—these are offset by massive potential losses in tariff revenue. The paper argues that the BLNS have limited independent trade policy space and suggests that negotiations with the EU should be conducted on a Customs Union-to-Customs Union basis.

The report identifies systemic governance failures in Lesotho, including a fragmented electoral system, weak separation of powers, and inadequate decentralisation. It highlights severe socio-economic challenges such as a 47.7% poverty rate (2017), rising violent crime, and gender-based discrimination under customary law. The document argues that these issues are exacerbated by corruption, poor infrastructure, and ineffective public policy-making, recommending comprehensive constitutional and legal reforms through the National Reforms Authority (NRA).

The author contends that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) are being emasculated by a lack of political will among African leaders. Specifically, the paper highlights how the 'quiet diplomacy' of South African President Thabo Mbeki and other leaders toward Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe reflects a deeper commitment among National Liberation Movement (NLM) governments to protect one another from democratic turnover. The author asserts that this solidarity among former liberation movements contradicts the stated goals of good governance and democracy required to attract G7 financial support, thereby risking the overall success of the African renewal process.

The document lists ten financing programs providing grants, seed funding, and technical assistance for renewable energy technologies. These programs target various stages of business development, from R&D and pilots to scaling and commercial expansion, primarily within African nations and other low-income or developing regions. Funding amounts vary significantly, ranging from small grants of US $15,000 to large-scale transition grants of up to US $15 million.

The fashion industry is a major contributor to global carbon emissions and water pollution, with a supply chain heavily reliant on fossil fuels and concentrated in low- and middle-income countries. Women comprise over 60% of the global garment workforce but face systemic barriers, including limited access to sustainable energy and underrepresentation in leadership. The report advocates for the adoption of renewable energy, circular fashion models, and gender-responsive policies to drive a sustainable transition. Key recommendations include scaling financial support for women-led SMEs, investing in green skills training, and implementing mandatory supply chain transparency to address environmental and social inequities.

The paper argues that local governments are underutilized actors in locally led adaptation (LLA) and demonstrates how the Local Climate Adaptive Living Facility (LoCAL) supports them through performance-based grants and capacity building. Using case studies from Niger, Lesotho, and Cambodia, the text shows that while local governments can effectively bridge the gap between national policy and community action, they may also reflect exclusionary power dynamics that require broader engagement with non-state actors to ensure inclusivity.

The Northern Drakensberg Collaborative (NDC), formalised in May 2023, is a partnership aimed at addressing water insecurity and unequal water access in the Northern Drakensberg Strategic Water Source Area. This region, covering approximately 10,000 km2, is critical for water supply to four South African provinces, including providing up to 30% of the water used in Gauteng. The NDC focuses on the upper uThukela catchment, seeking to improve the stewardship of water and natural resources while enhancing food security and resilience to climate change for local impoverished communities. The partnership includes traditional authorities, NGOs, research institutions, and the private sector, operating across strategic pillars of governance, networking, research, implementation, and resourcing.

WWF South Africa aims to transition from a conservation model that separated people from protected areas to one where local communities are primary custodians of 'Mega Living Landscapes' (MLLs) and Strategic Water Source Areas (SWSAs). The strategy focuses on four priority geographic areas: Zululand/Mpumalanga, Arid Zone/Northern Cape, and the Cape Floristic Region. To achieve this, WWF proposes four pathways: scaling up biodiversity stewardship and protection (including OECMs), enhancing community livelihoods through consolidated value offerings, driving an economic transition, and mobilising new scales of public and private finance.