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Marikana as a Tipping Point?
The document analyzes the decline of South Africa's mining sector, linking it to labour market inefficiency and a dysfunctional institutional framework. It argues that the current legal and political environment encourages a 'prisoners' dilemma' between mining houses and unions, where mutual defection (wildcat strikes) becomes the dominant strategy. The author suggests that democratizing labour relations through balloting and introducing credible third-party penalties for violence could transform this into an 'assurance game' that promotes long-term industry sustainability.
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Document type: Research paper
SACU and the Political Economy of Regionalism: Towards Deeper and Broader Integration?
The document analyses the transition of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) from a model of South African dominance and protectionism to one of 'open regionalism' and consensus-based decision-making under the 2002 agreement. Using game theory to explain the difficulties of regional cooperation, it argues that SACU's historical durability relied on a tradeoff where smaller members accepted South African policy dominance in exchange for generous shares of a common revenue pool. The 2002 agreement threatens this balance by seeking to reduce external tariffs, which would likely shrink the revenue pool, while granting smaller members veto rights over such reductions. The author suggests that for SACU to succeed in deepening integration or expanding membership to countries like Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, it must find new ways to align the strategic self-interests of member governments with collective developmental goals.
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Document type: Briefing
EUROPEAN UNION CARBON TAX
The document is a teaching guide designed to simulate negotiations over a proposed European Union carbon tax. It combines negotiation theory—drawing on works by Raiffa, Bazerman, Neale, Fisher, and Ury—with a technical game-theory model to show how cooperation can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes. The guide discusses the challenges of unilateral climate policy, specifically the risk of 'leakage' where emissions shift outside the EU, and the potential for carbon tax revenues to be used for fiscal reform to reduce unemployment.
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Document type: Guide