Evaluating EU Decision-Making Processes

The study examines the co-decision procedure involving the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the Council of the EU. It finds that informal processes, such as coalition-building and the leadership of the French Presidency, exerted more influence on the final policy outcome than formal rules. While the EP pushed for stricter social and environmental sustainability criteria, the final agreement largely reflected the economic and rational interests of the Commission and the Council, with the Council emerging as the most dominant actor.

• Informal dynamics, including coalition-building and organizational leadership, had a greater impact on the negotiations and the final policy outcome than formal institutional foundations.
• The Council of the EU was the most influential actor in the final policy agreement, largely due to the French Presidency's decision to require unanimity among heads of state for the Climate and Energy Package.
• The European Commission and the Council were primarily driven by economic considerations and energy security, whereas the European Parliament focused on social and environmental sustainability.
• The European Parliament's bargaining power was weakened because it entered final Trialogue negotiations without a position backed by a Plenary vote due to extreme time constraints and internal conflicts between the ITRE and ENVI committees.
• The final Directive established a 10 per cent renewable energy in transport target by 2020, which is open to all renewables and lacks the specific sub-targets or penalty mechanisms requested by the EP.
• The final sustainability criteria for biofuels include environmental regulations and social reporting obligations, but they do not apply to all biomass for energy production as the EP had demanded.
• The agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) emission saving threshold for biofuels is 35 per cent initially, rising to 50 per cent by 2017, with a 60 per cent requirement for installations starting in 2017.
• The final agreement adopted the energy allocation method for regulatory GHG calculations and the substitution method for policy analysis, reflecting the Commission's and Council's positions over the EP's preference for the substitution method.
• The European Parliament successfully secured a substantial review clause for the 2020 target and the GHG emission saving thresholds, which was one of its few significant victories in the final text.
• Industrial lobby groups, specifically the car and oil industry via the JEC-Consortium, influenced the final GHG default values, making the targets easier to achieve for European biofuel producers.

APA

Müngersdorff, M. (2009). Evaluating EU Decision-Making Processes. Stockholm Environment Institute. https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Sustainable-livelihoods/Evaluating-EU-WP-100319.pdf

Chicago

Müngersdorff, Maximilian. Evaluating EU Decision-Making Processes. Stockholm Environment Institute, 2009. https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Sustainable-livelihoods/Evaluating-EU-WP-100319.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Müngersdorff |first1=Maximilian |title=Evaluating EU Decision-Making Processes |publisher=Stockholm Environment Institute |date=2009 |url=https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Sustainable-livelihoods/Evaluating-EU-WP-100319.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mngersdorff2009evaluating, author = {Müngersdorff, Maximilian}, title = {{Evaluating EU Decision-Making Processes}}, institution = {Stockholm Environment Institute}, year = {2009}, url = {https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Sustainable-livelihoods/Evaluating-EU-WP-100319.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }