SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES
Summary
The research examines the role of emerging donors, specifically South Africa and Turkey, in peacebuilding within fragile states. It finds that while these providers often deliver more resources and exhibit greater flexibility and respect for national sovereignty than traditional donors, they lack a coherent theory of change and struggle with internal coordination and transparency. The study highlights a tension between the rhetoric of solidarity and the reality of strategic economic interests, such as trade and energy potential.
Key insights
- South Africa and Turkey often provide development assistance levels that match or exceed those of OECD-DAC donors during peak years in their respective target countries.
- Southern providers are generally more flexible and capable of operating in high-risk areas that traditional donors avoid, utilizing a demand-driven approach based on requests from recipient governments.
- A significant weakness of South–South peacebuilding is a tendency to prioritize state-to-state relations with ruling elites, which often results in the marginalization of civil society, political opposition, and minorities.
- Neither South Africa nor Turkey employs a structured peacebuilding model or a substantive theory of change to achieve durable peace, often privileging strong host-government relations over critical, inclusive approaches.
- Engagement is driven by realpolitik and mutual economic benefit rather than pure altruism; for South Africa, the Inga Dam's energy potential is a key driver in the DRC, while Turkey seeks global visibility and market expansion in Somalia.
- Both providers suffer from poor internal coordination and weak monitoring and evaluation systems, with South Africa specifically lacking a centralized foreign aid agency.
- Turkey has shifted its aid delivery model from multilateral channels to a predominantly bilateral approach, with multilateral ODA dropping from 60% in 2003 to 2% in 2014.
- There is currently no conclusive evidence that the peacebuilding approaches of Southern providers are more effective than those of Western donors in conflict-affected areas.
Cite the original document
- APA
- BESHARATI, N., RAWHANI, C., STEARNS, J., & SUCUOGLU, G. (2017). SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Occasional-Paper-254.pdf
- Chicago
- BESHARATI, NEISSAN, CARMEL RAWHANI, JASON STEARNS, and GIZEM SUCUOGLU. SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2017. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Occasional-Paper-254.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=BESHARATI |first1=NEISSAN |last2=RAWHANI |first2=CARMEL |last3=STEARNS |first3=JASON |last4=SUCUOGLU |first4=GIZEM |title=SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=March 2017 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Occasional-Paper-254.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{besharati2017southsouth, author = {BESHARATI, NEISSAN and RAWHANI, CARMEL and STEARNS, JASON and SUCUOGLU, GIZEM}, title = {{SOUTH–SOUTH PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS AND INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND SOUTH AFRICA’S SUPPORT TO FRAGILE STATES}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Occasional-Paper-254.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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