Prospects of the SPLA/M’s Transition into a Political Party in Sudan

The paper argues that the SPLA/M is unlikely to transition into a political party in the short term due to persistent security threats, lack of trust in the Khartoum government, and internal structural issues. It highlights how the Sudanese government's support for Southern militias and the linkage of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to the conflict in Darfur disincentivize the SPLA/M from disarming. The author emphasizes that a successful transition requires a clear settlement of North-South relations, the disarmament of pro-government militias, and a resolution to the Darfur crisis.

• The author concludes that the current political environment in Sudan is likely to prevent the SPLA/M from evolving into a political party, primarily because the movement cannot risk disarming while the government in Khartoum continues to support anti-SPLA Southern militias.
• The Sudanese government has strategically linked the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with international inaction regarding the genocide in Darfur, which serves as a further deterrent for the SPLA/M to transition to a civilian party.
• The SPLA/M's internal structure remains that of a national liberation army, characterized by authoritarian leadership and a military culture of hierarchy and obedience, which complicates its shift toward a democratic political party.
• While the SPLA/M is a broad Southern movement, it is heavily dominated by the Dinka tribal federation, leading to fears of Dinka hegemony among other Southern groups, such as the Nuer.
• Oil wealth is a central point of contention; the SPLA/M's transition is hindered by disputes over the redistribution of oil revenues and the central government's attempts to absorb oil-rich areas like Abyei and Kordofan into the North.
• The transition of leadership from John Garang de Mabior to Salva Kiir was successful in maintaining continuity, though the movement's original unionist discourse may have weakened in favor of Southern secessionist sentiment.
• International support for the SPLA/M is primarily Western and African, while the government in Khartoum has relied on Chinese and Malaysian oil firms to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and pressure.
• The author identifies five specific conditions that must be met before the SPLA/M can evolve into a political party: clarity in North-South relations, disarmament of anti-SPLA/M militias, full CPA implementation, a settlement in Darfur, and successful internal dialogues.

APA

Kalpakian, J. (2009). Prospects of the SPLA/M’s Transition into a Political Party in Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/Occasional-Paper-18.pdf

Chicago

Kalpakian, Jack. Prospects of the SPLA/M’s Transition into a Political Party in Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/Occasional-Paper-18.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kalpakian |first1=Jack |title=Prospects of the SPLA/M’s Transition into a Political Party in Sudan |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=April 2009 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/Occasional-Paper-18.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kalpakian2009prospects, author = {Kalpakian, Jack}, title = {{Prospects of the SPLA/M’s Transition into a Political Party in Sudan}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2009}, month = apr, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/Occasional-Paper-18.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }