rev_saiia_perisa_pg_cs1_muller_20131212-149f37996bfbcdc1.pdf
Summary
This case study by Mike Muller examines the political economy of water resource development and management within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It argues that a disconnect exists between local/national priorities and regional agendas, largely because the latter have been driven by donor preferences for environmental conservation over infrastructure development. The author highlights that while some bilateral projects have succeeded, the broader region has suffered from 'economic water scarcity' due to a lack of long-term finance for infrastructure, a gap recently being filled by new financiers like China and Brazil.
Key insights
- There is a significant disconnect between water resource management at local and national levels versus the regional level in SADC. This is attributed to a regional agenda that is driven by external funding and is not sufficiently aligned with national priorities.
- Traditional donors have prioritized environmental outcomes and regional management structures over national infrastructure development, which the author suggests has limited their overall impact and may have even been an intentional objective to limit resource development.
- The emergence of China and Brazil as financiers for public infrastructure has shifted the regional dynamic, as these countries provide funding for water resource projects that traditional donors avoided.
- The region suffers from 'economic water scarcity' rather than physical scarcity, meaning the primary obstacle to development is a lack of long-term, low-cost financial resources to build necessary infrastructure.
- Successful water projects in the region, such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the IncoMaputo agreement, were achieved through direct government-to-government technical structures rather than through autonomous River Basin Organisations (RBOs).
- Donor-driven environmental agendas have sometimes blocked development needs. For example, Botswana, supported by international environmental organisations, rebuffed Namibia's request for 2% of the Okavango river flow.
Cite the original document
- APA
- South African Institute of International Affairs (n.d.). rev_saiia_perisa_pg_cs1_muller_20131212-149f37996bfbcdc1.pdf. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REV_SAIIA_perisa_pg_CS1_muller_20131212.pdf
- Chicago
- South African Institute of International Affairs. rev_saiia_perisa_pg_cs1_muller_20131212-149f37996bfbcdc1.pdf. n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REV_SAIIA_perisa_pg_CS1_muller_20131212.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=rev_saiia_perisa_pg_cs1_muller_20131212-149f37996bfbcdc1.pdf |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REV_SAIIA_perisa_pg_CS1_muller_20131212.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairsndrevsaiiaperisapgcs1muller20131212149f37996bfbcdc1pdf, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{rev\_saiia\_perisa\_pg\_cs1\_muller\_20131212-149f37996bfbcdc1.pdf}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REV_SAIIA_perisa_pg_CS1_muller_20131212.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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