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Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds & the need for reform of the Kimberley Process

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This policy brief by the South African Institute of International Affairs examines the failure of the Kimberley Process (KP) to address human rights abuses and smuggling in Zimbabwe's Marange diamond fields. It argues that the KP's narrow definition of 'conflict diamonds'—which only covers rebel groups—is inadequate when abuses are perpetrated by state security forces. The authors call for a reform of the KP's definitions and monitoring mechanisms to include government accountability.

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  • The Kimberley Process (KP) definition of 'conflict diamonds' is limited to 'rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments', which the authors argue is inadequate for the situation in Marange where state forces are the perpetrators.
  • In Zimbabwe's Marange region, the army's 'Hakudzokwi kumunda' ('You will not return') operation in October 2008 was linked to severe human rights violations, including torture, rape, beatings, and forced labour.
  • Diamond smuggling from Marange involves syndicates of security forces, public officials, and private actors, with diamonds reaching markets in India, Israel, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates, often via Mozambique.
  • There are significant discrepancies in diamond revenues; while a 2010 auction of 900,000 carats raised $72 million, Zimbabwe's finance minister Tendai Biti claimed the treasury received almost no diamond-based revenue.
  • Concerns exist that diamond revenues are being used to fund pro-Zanu–PF militias and state security agents, and to repay a $98 million loan from China for a military college near Harare via the Anjin Investments joint venture.
  • The KP's November 2011 decision to approve Marange diamond sales followed a period of deadlock across four plenaries (Jerusalem, St Petersburg, Brussels, and Kinshasa) and led to the withdrawal of the founding partner Global Witness.
  • The authors recommend that the KP amend its definition of conflict diamonds to include governments, establish local focal-point monitoring mechanisms involving civil society, and require transparency in mining licence awards.

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APA
Masiya, T., & Benkenstein, A. (2012). Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds & the need for reform of the Kimberley Process. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Policy-Briefing-43.pdf
Chicago
Masiya, Tyanai, and Alex Benkenstein. Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds & the need for reform of the Kimberley Process. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2012. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Policy-Briefing-43.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Masiya |first1=Tyanai |last2=Benkenstein |first2=Alex |title=Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds & the need for reform of the Kimberley Process |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=February 2012 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Policy-Briefing-43.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{masiya2012zimbabwes, author = {Masiya, Tyanai and Benkenstein, Alex}, title = {{Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds \& the need for reform of the Kimberley Process}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2012}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Policy-Briefing-43.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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