THE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY CHARTER AT 11: AVERTING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION

The document argues that while the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides a normative framework, democratic processes in Africa have largely stagnated in a transitional phase, often trapped in an 'electoral fallacy' where regular elections occur without deep institutional consolidation. It identifies internal pressures—such as the rise of populism, election-related violence, and long-term leadership—and external pressures—including the influence of non-democratic powers like China, Russia, and Turkey, and a 'security-first' doctrine from Western actors—as primary drivers of democratic recession. Despite these challenges, the author notes positive signals such as the increasing number of charter signatories, the role of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the effectiveness of ECOWAS in restoring democracy in specific instances. The briefing recommends limiting the concentration of power through term limits and shifting international investment toward domestic democratic processes rather than just regional frameworks.

• Democratic progress in Africa is characterized by an 'electoral fallacy,' where the presence of regular elections does not translate into the diffusion of democratic governance across social and political institutions.
• Several factors contribute to the erosion of democracy, including the rise of populist rhetoric that challenges the rule of law, the closing of civil society spaces, and an increase in election-related violence often linked to perceived unfairness.
• External geopolitical influences have disrupted the path toward liberal democracy, specifically the 'transactional diplomacies' of China, Russia, and Turkey, which do not require democratic preconditions for engagement.
• Western security priorities, particularly the fight against terrorism in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, have led to a 'security-first doctrine' that prioritizes state survival over democratic consolidation.
• The African Union (AU) and regional bodies have shown capacity to enforce democratic norms, such as the AU's suspension of member states following unconstitutional changes of government and ECOWAS's role in restoring democracy in The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire.
• Long-term leadership remains a significant barrier to the diffusion of democratic norms, with 19 African leaders having ruled for over two decades as of the reporting period.

APA

Hengari, T. (2018). THE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY CHARTER AT 11: AVERTING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policy-Briefing-172.pdf

Chicago

Hengari, Tjiurimo. THE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY CHARTER AT 11: AVERTING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2018. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policy-Briefing-172.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Hengari |first1=Tjiurimo |title=THE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY CHARTER AT 11: AVERTING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=May 2018 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policy-Briefing-172.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{hengari2018african, author = {Hengari, Tjiurimo}, title = {{THE AFRICAN DEMOCRACY CHARTER AT 11: AVERTING DEMOCRATIC DECONSOLIDATION}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2018}, month = may, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policy-Briefing-172.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }