Dreaming Out Loud: Implications of a Doha End-Game for South Africa

The document analyses the political economy of the Doha Round's 'end-game' and its impact on South Africa. It highlights a conflict between South Africa's state-driven industrial policy and the liberalisation demands of the NAMA-agriculture 'exchange rate'. The authors argue that South Africa's interests are best served by preserving a NAMA carve-out for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and offering concessions in the services sector—specifically in telecommunications, transport, and energy—to secure agricultural gains from developed nations.

• The Doha Round is stalled due to a lack of political will among major players to make necessary compromises in three key areas: agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and services.
• The 'NAMA-Agriculture exchange rate' is viewed as unfairly weighted toward developed countries, as the US and EU seek to maintain agricultural subsidies while demanding that developing countries liberalise industrial tariffs.
• South Africa's domestic trade policy, driven by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), prioritises state-led industrial policy over liberalisation, leading to strong resistance against NAMA tariff reductions.
• South Africa has lobbied for a special 'carve-out' in NAMA negotiations for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to prevent member states like Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland from losing tariff revenue.
• In agriculture, South Africa maintains an 'offensive interest,' seeking the elimination of trade-distorting subsidies in OECD countries to improve market opportunities for its own agricultural exports.
• The authors suggest that South Africa should offer greater market access in the services sector—specifically in energy, telecommunications, and transport—as a strategic trade-off to preserve the SACU NAMA carve-out and gain agricultural concessions.
• There is significant internal conflict within South Africa's governing tripartite alliance regarding services; while business supports liberalisation, COSATU views it as a threat to public services and 'decent jobs'.
• The 'Swiss formula' used for NAMA tariff cuts is criticised by developing countries for imposing a higher reduction burden on them than on developed countries.

APA

Draper, P., & Dube, M. (2011). Dreaming Out Loud: Implications of a Doha End-Game for South Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Occasional-Paper-100.pdf

Chicago

Draper, Peter, and Memory Dube. Dreaming Out Loud: Implications of a Doha End-Game for South Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Occasional-Paper-100.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Draper |first1=Peter |last2=Dube |first2=Memory |title=Dreaming Out Loud: Implications of a Doha End-Game for South Africa |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Occasional-Paper-100.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{draper2011dreaming, author = {Draper, Peter and Dube, Memory}, title = {{Dreaming Out Loud: Implications of a Doha End-Game for South Africa}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Occasional-Paper-100.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }