The European Union After Enlargement

The briefing examines the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement, focusing on the difficulties of decision-making in a larger union, the management of member state diversity, and the financial strain of redistribution. It highlights the tension between the need for institutional reform—such as the proposed constitutional treaty—and the political realities of national interests, particularly regarding the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and budget ceilings. The author argues that while the EU has successfully used the 'open method of co-ordination' for economic reform via the Lisbon strategy, it remains prone to indecision and may become a less effective negotiating partner in multilateral trade contexts due to increased internal diversity.

• The expansion of the EU to 25 members has introduced three primary categories of challenges: decision-making, diversity, and redistribution. Decision-making is hindered by unwieldy institutions and the fact that larger groups generally struggle more to reach agreements.
• Diversity is most problematic in 'Justice and Home Affairs' and 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' because these areas are largely outside the acquis communautaire and require unanimous decision-making. Conversely, diversity is least problematic in market competition and common external commercial policy.
• The EU has attempted to manage economic diversity through the Lisbon strategy and the 'open method of co-ordination', which allows member states to tailor reform strategies to their own institutional and political requirements while the EU monitors progress.
• Redistribution is a significant point of failure and conflict, as accession countries are generally less wealthy and have larger agricultural sectors, triggering massive transfers from net-contributors to new members via regional development and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
• There is a conflict over the EU budget ceiling; the six largest net contributors, including Britain, France, and Germany, requested a limit of 1% of gross national income (GNI), while the Commission's 2007-2013 prospective averaged 1.14% of GNI.
• The EU's ability to act as an effective negotiating partner in multilateral trade may decrease because negotiators will have less autonomy from the diverse domestic political constituencies of a larger membership.

APA

Jones, E. (2004). The European Union After Enlargement. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Briefing6final.pdf

Chicago

Jones, Erik. The European Union After Enlargement. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Briefing6final.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Jones |first1=Erik |title=The European Union After Enlargement |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=October 2004 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Briefing6final.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{jones2004european, author = {Jones, Erik}, title = {{The European Union After Enlargement}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2004}, month = oct, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Briefing6final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }