Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War

The research paper analyzes the strategic motivations for terrorism in civil wars using a new dataset linking the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data and the Global Terrorism Database. It argues that terrorism serves to coerce governments and communicate resolve, particularly for militarily weaker groups. The study finds that the frequency of attacks increases with government repression and press freedom. Furthermore, it identifies a correlation between group ideology and targeting: groups with universalist ideologies (e.g., Marxist-socialist) predominantly target 'hard' official targets, while those with sectarian or religious ideologies are more likely to target 'soft' civilian targets due to stronger 'othering' of out-groups.

• Militarily weaker rebel groups are more likely to employ terrorist tactics extensively because they lack the capacity for conventional warfare and are less concerned about the counterproductive effects of terrorism on popular support compared to stronger groups.
• Government repression increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks, as a history of state violence makes the rebel group's target audience more permissive of terrorism.
• Greater press freedom encourages the use of terrorist tactics because it increases the visibility of spectacular attacks, allowing groups to spread fear and advertise their presence more effectively.
• Rebel groups with universalist political ideologies and inclusive audiences, such as Marxist-socialist groups, predominantly target 'hard' official targets (e.g., police and infrastructure) to maximize material damage while avoiding large civilian casualties.
• Groups with sectarian, ethno-nationalist, or religious ideologies are more likely to target 'soft' civilian targets because their ideologies create strong 'othering,' making civilians outside their core constituency legitimate targets.
• Groups lacking a clear ideology or specific goals are more likely to target soft civilian targets because they have fewer inhibitions regarding the loss of domestic popular support.

APA

Polo, S., & Gleditsch, K. S. (n.d.). Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/94b5df71-96ab-465c-bf4c-a8dc3e92d553/Twisting Arms and Sending Messages Terrorist Tactics in Civil War.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Polo, Sara, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/94b5df71-96ab-465c-bf4c-a8dc3e92d553/Twisting Arms and Sending Messages Terrorist Tactics in Civil War.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Polo |first1=Sara |last2=Gleditsch |first2=Kristian Skrede |title=Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/94b5df71-96ab-465c-bf4c-a8dc3e92d553/Twisting Arms and Sending Messages Terrorist Tactics in Civil War.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{polondtwisting, author = {Polo, Sara and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede}, title = {{Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/94b5df71-96ab-465c-bf4c-a8dc3e92d553/Twisting Arms and Sending Messages Terrorist Tactics in Civil War.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }