Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict

The report analyzes power-sharing as a tool to mitigate civil conflict by guaranteeing political roles to potential 'spoilers'. It argues that while power-sharing can promote peace when parties are evenly matched and conflict costs are high, it may increase conflict risks when groups are unevenly matched. The authors highlight significant trade-offs, noting that power-sharing prioritizes 'ex post fairness' over democratic 'ex ante uncertainty' and can lead to high transaction costs and agency losses, such as the selection of intransigent, group-based politicians.

• Power-sharing aims to reduce civil conflict risk by ensuring potential 'spoilers'—leaders with the capacity and will to use force—receive a guaranteed payoff from cooperation, making peaceful behavior more attractive than violence.
• The effectiveness of power-sharing depends on the balance of power; it is most likely to promote peace when fighting parties have roughly equal resources and the costs of war are high. Conversely, when groups are unevenly matched, power-sharing may increase conflict risk by creating incentives for spoilers.
• Power-sharing creates a democratic trade-off by prioritizing 'ex post fairness' (ensuring no group falls below an acceptable payoff level) at the expense of 'ex ante uncertainty' and 'procedural performance sensitivity' typical of majoritarian democracies.
• Power-sharing arrangements can suffer from high transaction costs, where the emphasis on consensus and the proliferation of veto players lead to political gridlock and difficulty in reaching decisions.
• The authors identify two primary agency costs: adverse selection, where the system recruits intransigent politicians who appeal to narrow sectional interests, and moral hazard, where politicians form 'elite cartels' to misuse public power behind closed doors.
• According to the 'paradox of power', resource-poor groups have a higher marginal utility for fighting, which can lead to a situation where military leaders or extremist splinter groups hold disproportionate bargaining power in power-sharing negotiations.

APA

Gates, S., & Strøm, K. (2007). Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45996c14-a01f-49a0-8566-6e9c07f2dc15/Theoretical_framework_report.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Gates, Scott, and Kaare Strøm. Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2007. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45996c14-a01f-49a0-8566-6e9c07f2dc15/Theoretical_framework_report.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gates |first1=Scott |last2=Strøm |first2=Kaare |title=Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2007 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45996c14-a01f-49a0-8566-6e9c07f2dc15/Theoretical_framework_report.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gates2007powersharing, author = {Gates, Scott and Strøm, Kaare}, title = {{Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2007}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45996c14-a01f-49a0-8566-6e9c07f2dc15/Theoretical_framework_report.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }