The Future of Armed Conflict

The author argues that while the end of the Cold War initially saw a rise in local conflicts, the overall trend is moving toward a more peaceful world. This optimism is grounded in the observed decline in the number of armed conflicts since the late 1990s and the positive influence of global trends such as poverty reduction, democratization, and the rise of international military interventions for conflict settlement. The analysis highlights that internal conflicts (civil wars) are the dominant form of violence and are most strongly linked to poverty, though the author distinguishes between 'greed' and 'grievance' motivations. The document also notes that while ethnic polarization and resource scarcity are often cited as causes of war, systematic evidence is often ambiguous or secondary to broader economic and political factors.

• Internal conflicts, or civil wars, have been the dominant form of armed conflict since the late 1950s, whereas interstate wars have become rare, with only two recorded in 2001.
• The number of armed conflicts rose immediately after the Cold War, particularly in Europe, but dropped significantly in the later 1990s and has since leveled out at a lower number than at the end of the Cold War.
• There is a robust correlation between poverty and armed conflict, though scholars disagree on whether this is driven by 'grievance' (rebellion of the poor against the rich for redistribution) or 'greed' (conflict as a means of funding rebel organizations through looting).
• Political systems influence conflict propensity: stable democracies and strict authoritarian regimes rarely experience civil wars, while 'semi-democratic' countries are most prone to them because they allow organized opposition but lack nonviolent resolution mechanisms.
• Ethnic fragmentation does not inherently predict conflict; instead, ethnic polarization—where a country is more evenly divided between two groups—is the more significant risk factor.
• Evidence for 'resource wars' is ambiguous; while most wars involve territorial control, systematic studies on water scarcity, soil erosion, and deforestation show inconsistent results regarding their role in triggering conflict.
• The author expresses optimism for the future of global peace based on three reinforcing factors: the eradication of absolute poverty, the continuing 'third wave' of democratization, and the improvement of regional 'neighborhoods' through these trends.
• Post-Cold War military interventions have shifted from unilateral actions serving national interests toward those approved by the international community to end terrorism, political repression, and illegal occupation.
• The conflict propensity of the Middle East, which exceeded the world average from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, has returned to the world average level as of 2002.

APA

Gleditsch, N. P. (2002). The Future of Armed Conflict. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d89a455d-b6d7-436f-8e7e-2f44212146db/The-future-of-armed-conflict.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. The Future of Armed Conflict. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2002. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d89a455d-b6d7-436f-8e7e-2f44212146db/The-future-of-armed-conflict.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gleditsch |first1=Nils Petter |title=The Future of Armed Conflict |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=December 2002 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d89a455d-b6d7-436f-8e7e-2f44212146db/The-future-of-armed-conflict.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gleditsch2002future, author = {Gleditsch, Nils Petter}, title = {{The Future of Armed Conflict}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2002}, month = dec, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d89a455d-b6d7-436f-8e7e-2f44212146db/The-future-of-armed-conflict.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }