Turns in the Long War as Drivers for Arms Control

The document argues that a prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine increases the risk of nuclear and conventional escalation, necessitating flexible, region-specific arms control mechanisms. It identifies critical risks—including the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, potential Russian nuclear testing, and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus—as catalysts for urgent multilateral risk reduction. The authors suggest that provisional 'inter-bellum' frameworks, such as no-fly zones in Eastern Europe or naval limits in the Black Sea, could eventually evolve into permanent treaties following a decisive Ukrainian victory.

• The risk of nuclear escalation is closely tied to the shifting dynamics of conventional battles, suggesting that future arms control must address the interplay between conventional and nuclear weapons.
• Russian control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses a severe security risk, with the potential for deliberate sabotage during a Russian retreat, similar to the explosion of the Kakhovka Dam.
• There is a risk that technical failures or human errors involving Russian nuclear assets could be falsely attributed to hostile actions by the US or its allies, necessitating open military-to-military communication and deconflicting mechanisms.
• Russia may attempt to resume nuclear testing, potentially camouflaging detonations as tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile or Poseidon torpedo/drone, which could trigger global mobilization for an effective test ban treaty.
• The deployment of Russian nuclear warheads in Belarus, combined with the presence of mercenary groups like Wagner or Redut, creates a risk of mutiny targeting nuclear storage facilities.
• The provision of F-16 fighters to Ukraine could lead to the establishment of a 'no-fly-zone' to protect air bases in Poland and Romania, which could later be upgraded into a broader ban on tactical aviation in parts of Eastern and Central Europe and Western Russia.
• Escalating maritime tensions in the Black Sea highlight the need for a new security regime that could include limits on warship size, a ban on submarines, and a prohibition of land-based anti-ship missiles, particularly hypersonic ones.

APA

Marsh, N., & Baev, P. (2024). Turns in the Long War as Drivers for Arms Control. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/08b783d0-819c-4788-9f99-7285ea5346e4/PRIO Policy Brief 17-2024.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Marsh, Nicholas, and Pavel Baev. Turns in the Long War as Drivers for Arms Control. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2024. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/08b783d0-819c-4788-9f99-7285ea5346e4/PRIO Policy Brief 17-2024.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Marsh |first1=Nicholas |last2=Baev |first2=Pavel |title=Turns in the Long War as Drivers for Arms Control |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2024 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/08b783d0-819c-4788-9f99-7285ea5346e4/PRIO Policy Brief 17-2024.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{marsh2024turns, author = {Marsh, Nicholas and Baev, Pavel}, title = {{Turns in the Long War as Drivers for Arms Control}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2024}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/08b783d0-819c-4788-9f99-7285ea5346e4/PRIO Policy Brief 17-2024.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }