Electoral Violence: Myanmar and the Indian Pattern

The author uses the 'Indian pattern' of communal violence to hypothesize that Myanmar's 2015 elections may trigger anti-Muslim riots and a resurgence of ethnic armed struggle. The paper argues that political elites, particularly the USDP and the military (Tatmadaw), may exploit religious and ethnic cleavages to maintain power or justify military intervention. It suggests short-term measures like postponing census results and long-term structural reforms such as federalism and proportional representation to mitigate these risks.

• Steven I. Wilkinson's research in India indicates a direct correlation between communal violence and polarized electoral competition, where politicians use anti-minority events to polarise the majority ethnic group and attract swing voters.
• In India, the escalation of ethnic rioting depends primarily on the will and capacity of the government; state forces typically prevent violence when it is in the government's electoral interest to protect minorities.
• There is a high risk that Buddhist nationalist mobilisation and anti-Muslim aggression will escalate before the 2015 elections, particularly in Bamar-dominated urban areas and Rakhine State, as the USDP and RNP may exploit religious cleavages to counter the NLD's popularity.
• The 2012 violence in Rakhine State was likely linked to political dynamics and local electoral competition, specifically the USDP's attempt to attract Muslim votes via temporary registration cards, which the RNDP viewed as an attempt to undermine them.
• Myanmar's first-past-the-post electoral system may marginalise ethnic-minority parties, potentially leading some armed ethnic groups to resume struggle if they feel the democratic process cannot secure their autonomy and rights.
• The Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) may have an incentive to allow or exploit communal and ethnic violence to justify a military intervention and legitimise their continued dominant political role.
• The publication of the 2014 national census results in May 2015 could be used to incite religious tension if the figures on Muslim population growth are higher than officially claimed.
• To reduce the risk of violence, the author recommends short-term measures including postponing religious census results, shelving Ma Ba Tha bills, and establishing alliances between Bamar and minority parties.
• Long-term stability requires a shift toward civilian control over the Tatmadaw, constitutional amendments for power-sharing, a federal structure for self-government, and a move toward proportional representation.

APA

Nilsen, M. (2015). Electoral Violence: Myanmar and the Indian Pattern. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9beb1f09-0ed6-4f4e-bec1-9caf5bebec66/Nilsen Electoral Violence_Myanmar and the Indian Pattern.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Nilsen, Marte. Electoral Violence: Myanmar and the Indian Pattern. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2015. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9beb1f09-0ed6-4f4e-bec1-9caf5bebec66/Nilsen Electoral Violence_Myanmar and the Indian Pattern.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Nilsen |first1=Marte |title=Electoral Violence: Myanmar and the Indian Pattern |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=1 May 2015 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9beb1f09-0ed6-4f4e-bec1-9caf5bebec66/Nilsen Electoral Violence_Myanmar and the Indian Pattern.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{nilsen2015electoral, author = {Nilsen, Marte}, title = {{Electoral Violence: Myanmar and the Indian Pattern}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2015}, month = may, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9beb1f09-0ed6-4f4e-bec1-9caf5bebec66/Nilsen Electoral Violence_Myanmar and the Indian Pattern.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }