THE GREEN LINE REGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN CYPRUS

The report evaluates the EU's Green Line Regulation (GLR) as a tool for liberal peace-building in Cyprus. While legally successful in providing a basis for movement across the divide, it has been only partially successful in generating economic activity. This failure is attributed to design flaws in the GLR and domestic legal, political, and psychological barriers.

• The Green Line Regulation (GLR) is considered a significant legal success because it created a lawful mechanism for the movement of goods and persons between an unrecognized entity and its parent state, which was previously impossible.
• Economic activity generated by the GLR has remained low and far below political expectations, failing to create substantial economic interdependence between the north and south of Cyprus.
• The GLR's design limits the volume of trade by restricting the movement of goods to those wholly obtained or substantially processed in north Cyprus, effectively excluding imported end products.
• The movement of services is severely underdeveloped due to the GLR's lack of clear definitions and specifications, focusing almost exclusively on VAT taxation rather than facilitating service provision.
• Trade in goods from north to south has been volatile and generally low; excluding a one-off electricity sale in 2011-2012, values decreased from a peak of €7.17 million in 2008 to €4.712 million in 2017.
• The movement of persons peaked shortly after the 2003 opening of checkpoints but has since declined and stabilized, with Turkish Cypriots crossing approximately twice as often as Greek Cypriots.
• Legal and administrative obstacles, including the Republic of Cyprus's non-recognition of 'TRNC' institutions and the banning of processed foods and food contact materials since 2011 and 2015, hinder trade.
• Political interests drive both sides to limit cooperation: the Republic of Cyprus fears 'recognition by implication' of the 'TRNC', while the 'TRNC' leadership has pressured traders to avoid using southern ports to maintain the argument for opening northern ports.
• Deep-seated psychological barriers and social pressures in the Greek Cypriot community lead to a reluctance to purchase Turkish Cypriot products, often resulting in traders removing tags to hide the origin of goods.
• The Republic of Cyprus's political belief that the economic development of the north would hinder reunification contradicts the EU's liberal peace approach, which views such development as a prerequisite for reunification.

APA

Ersözer, F. (2019). THE GREEN LINE REGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN CYPRUS. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/56879ab1-e024-483c-aed9-b74b85d6172a/Ersozer - The Green Line Regulation PCC Report 9-2019.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Ersözer, Fadıl. THE GREEN LINE REGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN CYPRUS. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2019. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/56879ab1-e024-483c-aed9-b74b85d6172a/Ersozer - The Green Line Regulation PCC Report 9-2019.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ersözer |first1=Fadıl |title=THE GREEN LINE REGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN CYPRUS |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2019 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/56879ab1-e024-483c-aed9-b74b85d6172a/Ersozer - The Green Line Regulation PCC Report 9-2019.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{erszer2019green, author = {Ersözer, Fadıl}, title = {{THE GREEN LINE REGULATION AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION IN CYPRUS}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2019}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/56879ab1-e024-483c-aed9-b74b85d6172a/Ersozer - The Green Line Regulation PCC Report 9-2019.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }