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The document analyzes the 1994 Convention of Government, the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, and the 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement. It argues that these efforts were limited by their exclusiveness, reliance on ethnic categorizations, and external international pressure, which often overshadowed home-grown solutions.

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  • Three major power-sharing agreements were signed between 1994 and 2004, but none fully achieved the goals of peace and good governance because they failed to include all parties to the conflict, which allowed 'spoilers' to emerge and prolonged the war.
  • The 1994 Convention of Government failed because it ignored the 1993 democratic election results, excluded rebel groups, and did not address the primary causes of the civil war, leading to a military coup in 1996.
  • The 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement established a democratic power-sharing system and a three-year transitional coalition government, but it did not include ceasefire agreements with major rebel groups, meaning the civil war continued.
  • The 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement and the subsequent 2005 constitution ensured proportional ethnic representation in political power and security forces; however, the ruling CNDD-FDD's attempts to monopolize power and a lack of political dialogue have made its success precarious.
  • The Burundi experience suggests four lessons: the need for inclusive negotiations to avoid spoilers, the necessity of moving toward a non-ethnicized vision of state power with a 'sunset date' for ethnic stipulations, the fact that constitutional rules alone cannot guarantee elite cooperation without political will, and the risk that heavy international pressure can overshadow home-grown solutions.

Cite the original document

APA
Falch, Å. (2008). Power-sharing To Build Peace? Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2dbe9133-c649-41ab-9be6-4a4568408e1d/Burundi Policy Brief.pdf?inline=true
Chicago
Falch, Åshild. Power-sharing To Build Peace? Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2008. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2dbe9133-c649-41ab-9be6-4a4568408e1d/Burundi Policy Brief.pdf?inline=true.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Falch |first1=Åshild |title=Power-sharing To Build Peace? |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=February 2008 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2dbe9133-c649-41ab-9be6-4a4568408e1d/Burundi Policy Brief.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{falch2008powersharing, author = {Falch, Åshild}, title = {{Power-sharing To Build Peace?}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2008}, month = feb, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2dbe9133-c649-41ab-9be6-4a4568408e1d/Burundi Policy Brief.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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