The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000

The study finds that youth bulges significantly increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, particularly when combined with economic stagnation. Using a dataset of sovereign states and dependent areas from 1950 to 2000, the author argues that the risk is heightened in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world where youth bulges coexist with poor economic performance and unstable political regimes. The research rejects Samuel P. Huntington's theory of a specific 'critical level' threshold for conflict and suggests that previous World Bank studies failed to find these effects due to flawed measurement methods. Additionally, the author identifies migration as a critical 'safety valve' that can mitigate youth discontent.

• Youth bulges are robustly associated with an increased risk of domestic armed conflict; specifically, a one percentage point increase in a youth bulge is linked to approximately a 7% increase in conflict likelihood.
• The risk of conflict associated with youth bulges is significantly amplified during periods of economic stagnation or recession.
• The study finds no empirical evidence to support Samuel P. Huntington's proposition that conflict risk increases non-linearly once youth bulges reach a specific 'critical level' (such as 20% of the population).
• The author argues that previous World Bank research failed to find a significant link between youth bulges and conflict because they measured youth cohorts relative to the total population rather than the adult population, which underestimates bulges in rapidly growing populations.
• The relationship between youth bulges and conflict appears to have changed over time; the effect was positive and significant during the Cold War (1950-1989) but became insignificant and negative in the post-Cold War period (1990-2000).
• Political regime type exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with conflict risk, where intermediary and unstable regimes are more prone to conflict than either stable democracies or stark autocracies.
• Migration serves as a critical mitigating factor, acting as a 'safety valve' for youth discontent and reducing the likelihood of domestic violence.
• Based on 2000 data, countries identified as particularly vulnerable due to the combination of youth bulges, intermediary regimes, and stagnant economic growth include Zambia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Yemen, Niger, Togo, Iran, and Jordan.

APA

Urdal, H. (2004). The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/37cda26a-0f88-4d4c-b210-ba867408058e/29740.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Urdal, Henrik. The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2004. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/37cda26a-0f88-4d4c-b210-ba867408058e/29740.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Urdal |first1=Henrik |title=The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000 |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=July 2004 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/37cda26a-0f88-4d4c-b210-ba867408058e/29740.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{urdal2004devil, author = {Urdal, Henrik}, title = {{The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2004}, month = jul, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/37cda26a-0f88-4d4c-b210-ba867408058e/29740.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }