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The report examines 145 public statements by Boko Haram, finding that the group's messaging often serves as a precursor to violent operations by signaling target groups and geographic expansions through specific grievances.

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  • Boko Haram messaging evolved through three distinct phases: Phase I (March 2010 to September 2012) characterized by the Qaqa/Shekau period; Phase II (September 2012 to March 2015) marked by Shekau's dominance; and Phase III (March 2015 to August 2016) influenced by the Islamic State.
  • The group frequently uses public warnings tied to specific grievances as indicators of future targeting, such as the campaign to burn schools following complaints about the mistreatment of almajiri students and teachers, and attacks on cell phone masts after accusing providers of releasing information.
  • The most frequent theme in the group's messaging is claiming attacks to increase awareness of its activities, appearing in approximately half of all messages in each year since 2011, except for 2015.
  • Boko Haram's language usage shifted from a primary reliance on Hausa to an increasing use of Arabic, particularly between 2014 and 2015, as the group sought a more external and international audience.
  • The group's geographic expansion into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad was preceded by messaging patterns involving repeated public warnings tied to the detention of group members.
  • Boko Haram maintains a strict and narrow definition of 'innocence' based on its version of Islam, using the process of takfir to declare other Muslims as non-believers and thus legitimate targets if they participate in democracy or associate with Christians.
  • The group's messaging strategy shifted toward the Internet and social media, with all 28 messages in 2015 appearing on YouTube and Twitter, reducing the need for a dedicated press spokesperson.
  • The Media Office of the West Africa Province (MOWAP), established after the March 2015 pledge to the Islamic State, shifted messaging toward high-production visual displays of strength and themes of justice and governance rather than long-winded speeches by Shekau.

Cite the original document

APA
Mahmood, O. S. (2017). More than propaganda. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war20.pdf
Chicago
Mahmood, Omar S. More than propaganda. Institute for Security Studies, 2017. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war20.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mahmood |first1=Omar S |title=More than propaganda |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=March 2017 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war20.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document issafri-002830)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mahmood2017more, author = {Mahmood, Omar S}, title = {{More than propaganda}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war20.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document issafri-002830} }

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