Biological Weapons Convention Confidence, the prohibition and learning from the past
Summary
This research paper argues that the Biological Weapons Convention's reliance on technical Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is insufficient because diplomatic 'defensive reasoning' creates a 'bypass' that allows states to ignore non-compliance and historical erasures.
Key insights
- The authors contend that promoting confidence in the BWC requires moving beyond the mere refinement of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), as focusing solely on these operational forms has restricted the scope of discussions on how to actually foster confidence.
- Despite public evidence from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other sources, South Africa has not declared its apartheid-era offensive biological research and development programme (Project Coast, 1981–1995) in its BWC CBMs, and this omission has received almost no attention in formal BWC proceedings.
- A documentary review of BWC meetings between 2007 and 2012 found that CBM discussions were preoccupied with technical issues of submission quality and quantity, while 'Form F' (declarations of past activities) received no significant attention regarding its content or need for revision.
- The paper identifies a prevalence of 'defensive reasoning' among diplomats and officials, where they avoid making statements that could cause political embarrassment or appear threatening, thereby creating self-reinforcing routines that inhibit robust inquiry and learning.
- The authors developed an 'action map' showing that the 'bypass' of difficult issues is maintained by factors such as the limited accessibility of CBMs, fear of appearing ignorant, and the tendency to view the questioning of other states' CBMs as 'doing politics'.
- The research suggests that the current practice of equating CBM participation with confidence is flawed; true confidence requires a transformative process of restructuring relations and changing security expectations rather than just filling out forms.
- The authors propose a four-part strategy to improve the BWC, including building confidence beyond CBMs, recognizing the need for interactional transformation, and creating 'safe spaces' for informal consultations outside the formal BWC process.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Rappert, B., & Gould, C. (2014). Biological Weapons Convention Confidence, the prohibition and learning from the past. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper258.pdf
- Chicago
- Rappert, Brian, and Chandré Gould. Biological Weapons Convention Confidence, the prohibition and learning from the past. Institute for Security Studies, 2014. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper258.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Rappert |first1=Brian |last2=Gould |first2=Chandré |title=Biological Weapons Convention Confidence, the prohibition and learning from the past |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=July 2014 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper258.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document issafri-002546)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{rappert2014biological, author = {Rappert, Brian and Gould, Chandré}, title = {{Biological Weapons Convention Confidence, the prohibition and learning from the past}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2014}, month = jul, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper258.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document issafri-002546} }
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