Elections and accountability in South Africa

The paper finds that while South African voters are willing to withdraw support from the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) due to poor performance, they rarely shift that support to opposition parties, often retreating into an 'independent' category instead. This lack of inter-party movement is driven by negative perceptions of opposition parties as exclusive or untrustworthy, as well as low levels of 'cognitive mobilisation' among the electorate, where many voters are 'ritual partisans' or 'apoliticals' rather than sophisticated 'apartisans'. Consequently, traditional sanctioning through elections is weak, and accountability manifests more as a 'selection' process where voters choose the best available option rather than punishing the incumbent.

• Voters in South Africa demonstrate a willingness to withdraw support from the incumbent party based on performance, but they are unlikely to transfer that support to opposition parties, which weakens the traditional sanctioning function of elections.
• Analysis of voter trends between 1994 and 2009 reveals a general decline in electoral participation; specifically, the proportion of the eligible voting age population (VAP) voting for the ANC decreased from 53% in 1994 to 38.8% in 2009.
• Partisanship in South Africa has fluctuated, with a significant rise in 'non-partisans' or 'floating voters' who make up roughly one-third to one-half of the electorate, including a substantial number of black African voters.
• Voter support for the ANC is influenced by economic evaluations, with a stronger correlation found for sociotropic evaluations (perceptions of the broader economy) than for egocentric evaluations (personal finances), although the poorest voters are more likely to rely on their own 'pocketbook' situation.
• The electorate is characterized by low 'cognitive mobilisation', with an average of only 10% of voters possessing both the political skills and motivation to engage with politics independently of party cues.
• A large portion of the electorate consists of 'ritual partisans' (approximately 50%) who are mobilised by habitual party attachments rather than cognitive engagement, making them less likely to punish incumbents based on performance.
• Perceptions of party 'inclusiveness' act as a critical heuristic for voters; viewing the ANC as inclusive was a virtually necessary condition for support in 1994 and 1999, while negative or ambiguous images of opposition parties repel potential supporters.
• Because traditional sanctioning is weak, electoral accountability in South Africa functions more as 'selection accountability', where voters choose the best available option among perceived alternatives rather than voting specifically to punish the incumbent.

APA

Schulz-Herzenberg, C. (2009). Elections and accountability in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper188.pdf

Chicago

Schulz-Herzenberg, Collette. Elections and accountability in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2009. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper188.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Schulz-Herzenberg |first1=Collette |title=Elections and accountability in South Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=June 2009 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper188.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{schulzherzenberg2009elections, author = {Schulz-Herzenberg, Collette}, title = {{Elections and accountability in South Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2009}, month = jun, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper188.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }