From market for force to market for peace

The monograph examines the transition of private military and security companies (PMSCs) from combat-oriented 'markets for force' to support-oriented 'markets for peace' in Africa. It analyzes the legal ambiguities surrounding PMSC status under international humanitarian law, the challenges of accountability and transparency in hybrid missions in countries like Liberia and Sudan, and the tension between the pragmatic need for private capacity and the moral concerns regarding the privatization of state security functions. The authors propose a 'steering and rowing' framework to ensure that the UN and AU maintain strategic control while utilizing private firms for non-core technical and logistical support.

• There is a significant distinction between traditional mercenaries and modern PMSCs; while mercenaries are often individual 'soldiers of fortune', PMSCs are legally registered corporate entities providing a range of professional services.
• The African Union's historical opposition to private armies is rooted in the 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, which was designed to protect new states from threats to sovereignty.
• PMSCs have become essential for providing specialized capabilities that member states often cannot or will not provide, particularly in aviation, logistics, and technical support.
• In Liberia, a hybrid model of security reform saw the US State Department contracting DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) to restructure the military and police, though this was marred by a lack of contract transparency.
• The use of PMSCs in Sudan and Darfur has raised accountability concerns, including allegations that subcontractors for DynCorp delivered weapons to Al-Shabaab and violated international arms embargos via Badr Airlines.
• Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), PMSC employees occupy a 'grey zone' where they are technically civilians unless they take a direct part in hostilities, at which point they lose their protected status.
• The 'steering and rowing approach to peacekeeping' (SRAP) proposes that the UN and AU should exclusively 'steer' (set policy and strategy) while PMSCs are restricted to 'rowing' (providing technical and logistical support).
• State responsibility for IHL violations cannot be outsourced; hiring states remain liable for the actions of contracted PMSCs, especially if they fail to provide proper training or oversight.
• In West Africa, the 'arms to Africa scandal' involving Sandline International demonstrated how PMSCs can violate UN embargos and trade security for natural resources, such as diamondiferous land in Sierra Leone.
• The authors recommend that the AU review the 1977 Convention to accommodate the modern reality of PMSCs, provided they are restricted to non-combat roles and subject to regional registration and monitoring.

APA

Gumedze, S., Olaniyan, A. O., & George, E. (n.d.). From market for force to market for peace. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono183.pdf

Chicago

Gumedze, Sabelo, Azeez O Olaniyan, and Eric George. From market for force to market for peace. Institute for Security Studies, n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono183.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gumedze |first1=Sabelo |last2=Olaniyan |first2=Azeez O |last3=George |first3=Eric |title=From market for force to market for peace |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono183.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gumedzendfrom, author = {Gumedze, Sabelo and Olaniyan, Azeez O and George, Eric}, title = {{From market for force to market for peace}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono183.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }