Elections for sale: Political-party funding – a necessary evil?

The document examines the relationship between political party funding and corruption in Africa, arguing that unregulated private financing and the abuse of state resources lead to state capture and the erosion of democratic legitimacy. Through case studies of South Africa, Ghana, and Burundi, it highlights the gap between formal anti-corruption commitments and actual implementation. The author proposes a comprehensive regulatory framework including public disclosure, expenditure caps, and the potential creation of a national democracy fund to decouple donors from direct political influence.

• Corruption in political party financing, including covert funding and the use of state resources for party purposes, undermines democratic governance and citizen trust in the political process across Africa.
• State capture occurs when private firms provide illicit gains to public officials to shape laws, policies, and regulations to their own advantage, creating a cycle of poor governance.
• Africa has experienced significant economic loss due to illicit financial flows, estimated at over US$1 trillion over the last 50 years, a sum roughly equal to all official development assistance received by the continent in that period.
• In South Africa, public funding for political parties is regulated and monitored, but private funding remains almost entirely unregulated and discretionary in terms of disclosure.
• Ghana's legal framework allows political parties to raise private domestic funds without limits or disclosure requirements for donor identities, contributing to a perception of parties as highly corrupt institutions.
• Burundi's political party funding is unstable and unreliable; while the law allows for public funding, it is often omitted from annual budgets, and the political environment is dominated by corrupt practices.
• Many African political parties suffer from a lack of internal democracy, characterized by centralized decision-making and the suppression of dissent, which facilitates the spread of corruption.
• The author recommends a regulatory regime featuring full public disclosure for donations above a certain threshold, caps on contributions per donor, and limits on election expenditure.
• A proposed 'national democracy fund' could serve as an independent body to channel corporate donations to parties via a formula, reducing secrecy and conflicts of interest.

APA

February, J. (n.d.). Elections for sale: Political-party funding – a necessary evil? Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/iss-sida-2.pdf

Chicago

February, Judith. Elections for sale: Political-party funding – a necessary evil? Institute for Security Studies, n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/iss-sida-2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=February |first1=Judith |title=Elections for sale: Political-party funding – a necessary evil? |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/iss-sida-2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{februaryndelections, author = {February, Judith}, title = {{Elections for sale: Political-party funding – a necessary evil?}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/iss-sida-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }