chap-2-7d13af862a431002.pdf

The document analyzes the evolution of Rhodesian command and control from the early Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) to the creation of Combined Operations (COMOPS). It highlights systemic failures, including inter-service friction between the Army and Police, the absence of a coherent national strategy, and the over-centralization of tactical decisions by high command, which marginalized operational commanders and neglected long-term strategic planning.

• Early Rhodesian counter-insurgency efforts were hampered by a perception that the insurgency was primarily a military threat rather than a socio-economic or political problem, coupled with a paternalistic view of the black African population.
• The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) system, designed for multi-agency coordination, suffered from friction caused by the British South Africa Police's resentment of Army dominance, leading the Police to refer JOC decisions to their own headquarters for ratification.
• The creation of Combined Operations (COMOPS) in 1977 failed to establish a truly unified command because the Commander COMOPS lacked the rank and authority to enforce compliance from other security heads, effectively acting as a chairman of the National Joint Operations Centre (NATJOC) rather than a supreme commander.
• COMOPS over-involved itself in the detailed tactical planning and execution of external operations, which precluded the formulation of a coherent national military strategy and stripped Army commanders of their operational authority.
• The attempt to establish a dedicated Headquarters Special Forces on 1 July 1978 failed after only seven weeks due to mutual dislike between the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service, and opposition from the Commander COMOPS who wished to retain direct control.
• Rhodesian military strategy was characterized by a lack of a coherent total national strategy and a failure to establish a formalized coordinating machine from the start of the incursions in the 1960s.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). chap-2-7d13af862a431002.pdf. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 2.PDF

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. chap-2-7d13af862a431002.pdf. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 2.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=chap-2-7d13af862a431002.pdf |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 2.PDF |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndchap27d13af862a431002pdf, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{chap-2-7d13af862a431002.pdf}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/CHAP 2.PDF}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }