The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities

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The African Union's African Standby Force (ASF) is unlikely to reach full operational capability by January 2016, but the AU has successfully demonstrated its ability to conduct peace operations using diverse models. The authors argue that the AU should move away from costly exercises and instead update the ASF's doctrine to reflect current conflict trends, such as counter-terrorism and asymmetric warfare, which differ from the original 2003 conceptualization.

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  • While the African Union (AU) aimed for the African Standby Force (ASF) to reach full operating capability by January 2016, the authors state it will not be fully operational by that date.
  • The AU has successfully positioned itself as an indispensable actor in peace operations, deploying to 11 countries over a decade and increasing annual African contributions to UN peacekeeping from 10,000 to 35,000 personnel.
  • Actual AU deployments have diverged from the original ASF model of AU-regional cooperation. Only operations in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) followed the ASF model; others used a UN-style model (Darfur and Somalia), a 'lead nation model' (Burundi and the Comoros), or 'coalitions of the willing' (against Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army).
  • The nature of AU peace support operations has evolved beyond the original doctrine to include offensive operations, counter-terrorism, stabilization roles, security sector reform, and responses to asymmetric tactics.
  • The authors recommend a new operational design that accepts multiple deployment models instead of a single one, and suggest that costly exercises like AMANI II in South Africa contribute little to achieving Full Operational Capability.

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APA
Lotze, W., & Leijenaar, A. (2015). The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-standby-force-beyond-2015-ideals-versus-realities
Chicago
Lotze, Walter, and Annette Leijenaar. The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities. Institute for Security Studies, 2015. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-standby-force-beyond-2015-ideals-versus-realities.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Lotze |first1=Walter |last2=Leijenaar |first2=Annette |title=The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=14 September 2015 |url=https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-standby-force-beyond-2015-ideals-versus-realities |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{lotze2015african, author = {Lotze, Walter and Leijenaar, Annette}, title = {{The African Standby Force beyond 2015: ideals versus realities}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2015}, month = sep, url = {https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-standby-force-beyond-2015-ideals-versus-realities}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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