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This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the proliferation of armed groups in Mali following the 2012 crisis, examining the motivations behind their creation, the dynamics of their alliances, and the challenges facing the implementation of the June 2015 peace agreement.

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  • The number of armed groups associated with the peace process in northern Mali increased from two (MNLA and HCUA) to eight (MNLA, HCUA, MAA1, CMFPR I, MAA2, CPA, CMFPR II, GATIA) between 2012 and 2015. This proliferation occurred in three phases aligned with the peace negotiation calendar, often driven by a need for representativity or as a reaction to the cycle of negotiations.
  • Armed groups in the north formed two primary coalitions in June 2014 during the Algiers negotiations: the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), which included the MNLA, HCUA, and dissident MAA, and the Platform, which originally consisted of CMFPR I, the MAA, and the CPA.
  • The terrorist threat has expanded from the north into other regions of Mali. This includes the emergence of Katiba Ansar Dine Macina in the Mopti region (centre) and Katiba Khalid Ibn Walid (Ansar Dine of the South) in the Sikasso region (south), as well as bombings in the capital, Bamako.
  • The Imghad and Allied Touareg Self Defence movement (GATIA), established on 14 August 2014, is primarily composed of the Tuareg Imghad community. While it presents as a self-defence movement and denies being a government militia, there are suspicions regarding links between its leaders and high-level officers in the Malian army.
  • The June 2015 peace agreement has faced significant implementation hurdles, including internal break-ups within groups like the CPA and the boycott of the March 2016 Kidal Forum by the government and the Platform due to disputes over the presence of the Malian army.
  • Critics argue the June 2015 agreement is flawed because it focuses on the distribution of political power while neglecting structural root causes such as drug trafficking, endemic corruption, and bad governance. Additionally, a lack of inclusiveness has left much of the population unaware of the agreement's contents.

Cite the original document

APA
Maïga, I. (2016). Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf
Chicago
Maïga, Ibrahim. Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels. Institute for Security Studies, 2016. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Maïga |first1=Ibrahim |title=Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=June 2016 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{maga2016armed, author = {Maïga, Ibrahim}, title = {{Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2016}, month = jun, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WestAfricaReport17.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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