Southern Sudan: the option of secession and its regional implications
Summary
This report summarizes an expert roundtable held on September 30, 2010, regarding the potential secession of Southern Sudan following its scheduled January 2011 self-determination referendum. It examines the unresolved issues between Northern and Southern Sudan, the internal challenges facing a potential new state, and the resulting security and economic implications for the Horn and central Africa regions.
Key insights
- Several critical issues remained unresolved prior to the January 2011 referendum, including border demarcation, citizenship, the division of oil revenues, currency, debt management, the status of integrated state institutions (specifically security agencies), and the impact of a split on international conventions and treaties binding on Sudan.
- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is viewed as an imperfect solution because it fails to address the urgent concerns of the Blue Nile states and the Nuba Mountains, and it does not specify the channels for a continuing relationship between the north and south if secession occurs.
- While many southerners view secession as inevitable, there are concerns that Southern Sudan could become a weak or ungoverned entity due to internal challenges such as tribal conflicts, inefficient disarmament and demobilisation, and the ability of the SPLM to implement inclusive governance.
- A potential independent Southern Sudan faces significant regional security challenges, including the need to obtain a monopoly on the use of force, control its borders, and contain the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
- The emergence of a new state may exacerbate territorial disputes over the Gambella region of Ethiopia and the Ilemi triangle, which is claimed by Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia, particularly as oil deposits have been discovered in these areas.
- Regional security dynamics are further complicated by the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the presence of Ugandan forces pursuing LRA leaders, which may clash with a new Southern Sudanese state's desire to exert its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- As a landlocked state, an independent Southern Sudan would be dependent on regional infrastructure for imports and exports, potentially leading it to seek strategic relations with neighbors to reduce its dependence on the north, especially regarding resource management.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Atta-Asamoah, A., & Hemmer, J. (2011). Southern Sudan: the option of secession and its regional implications. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SouthernSudan30Sep2010.pdf
- Chicago
- Atta-Asamoah, Andrews, and Jort Hemmer. Southern Sudan: the option of secession and its regional implications. Institute for Security Studies, 2011. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SouthernSudan30Sep2010.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Atta-Asamoah |first1=Andrews |last2=Hemmer |first2=Jort |title=Southern Sudan: the option of secession and its regional implications |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2011 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SouthernSudan30Sep2010.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{attaasamoah2011southern, author = {Atta-Asamoah, Andrews and Hemmer, Jort}, title = {{Southern Sudan: the option of secession and its regional implications}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2011}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SouthernSudan30Sep2010.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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