Summary
This report argues that political instability and violent protests in South Africa are primarily driven by unmanageable elite contestation within the African National Congress (ANC) rather than spontaneous socio-economic grievances. Using data modelling and artificial intelligence, the authors demonstrate a strong correlation between ANC internal conflicts and protest spikes, particularly from 2018 onwards, while finding a low correlation with service delivery or unemployment trends.
Key insights
- Political protests in South Africa are significantly driven by elite contestation within the African National Congress (ANC) rather than being spontaneous revolts of the poor. While socio-economic grievances like poverty and unemployment provide 'fuel', the sparks are often lit by political entrepreneurs within the ANC contesting for authority.
- Quantitative analysis using data modelling and artificial intelligence shows that ANC events have significantly higher explanatory power for predicting protests than service delivery or political economy data. The correlation coefficient for ANC events was 0.253, which is nearly triple the 0.092 correlation found for service delivery data.
- Between 2013 and 2017, protests in South Africa stabilised or declined. The report attributes this to the use of patronage and repression by former President Jacob Zuma to manage internal party infighting, which occurred at the expense of the economy, state capability, and the constitutional framework.
- The sharp increase in protests from 2018, culminating in the July 2021 unrest, suggests that President Cyril Ramaphosa lacks the autocratic power and patronage resources that Jacob Zuma used to suppress elite contestation.
- There is a noted correlation between the decline in public protests during Zuma's second term and a rise in politically targeted killings and assassinations, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal starting in 2015.
- The report warns that as the ANC declines and becomes less attractive to aspirant elites, contestation for power is likely to become more violent and move further outside the constitutional and parliamentary framework, potentially involving organised criminal networks.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Chipkin, I., Vidojevic, J., Rau, L., & Saksenberg, D. (2022). Dangerous elites. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-49-2.pdf
- Chicago
- Chipkin, Ivor, Jelena Vidojevic, Laurence Rau, and Daniel Saksenberg. Dangerous elites. Institute for Security Studies, 2022. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-49-2.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Chipkin |first1=Ivor |last2=Vidojevic |first2=Jelena |last3=Rau |first3=Laurence |last4=Saksenberg |first4=Daniel |title=Dangerous elites |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=16 March 2022 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-49-2.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{chipkin2022dangerous, author = {Chipkin, Ivor and Vidojevic, Jelena and Rau, Laurence and Saksenberg, Daniel}, title = {{Dangerous elites}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2022}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-49-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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